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A crucial concern of early modern geometry was fixing appropriate norms for deciding whether some
objects, procedures, or arguments should or should not be allowed into it. According to Bos, this is the exactness
concern. I argue that Descartes’s way of responding to this concern was to suggest an appropriate conservative
extension of Euclid’s plane geometry (EPG). In Section 2, I outline the exactness concern as, I think, it appeared
to Descartes. In Section 3, I account for Descartes’s views on exactness and for his attitude towards the most
common sorts of constructions in classical geometry. I also explain in which sense his geometry can be con-
ceived as a conservative extension of EPG. I conclude by briefly discussing some structural similarities and
differences between Descartes’s geometry and EPG.
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Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 431. Introduction
A crucial concern of early modern geometry was that of fixing appropriate norms for
deciding whether some objects, procedures, or arguments should or should not be allowed
in it. Henk Bos has devoted his main book to this concern, which he understands as an
“endeavour to clarify and institute exactness” [Bos 2001, 3]. It focuses especially on Des-
cartes and the way he changed the “concept of construction.” It is, to my mind, the most
valuable study ever written on Descartes’s geometry and its historical framework. Though
I widely agree with Bos’s insight, I would like to discuss and partially challenge some of his
views.
Descartes’s geometry is a conservative extension of Euclid’s, and providing this extension
is Descartes’s way of responding to the exactness concern. This is the main thesis I shall
defend. To introduce it, let me offer a preliminary clarification in three points.
The first point concerns what I mean by ‘Euclid’s geometry’. This is the theory
expounded in the first six books of the Elements and in the Data. To be more precise, I call
it ‘Euclid’s plane geometry’, or ‘EPG,’ for short.1 It is not a formal theory in the modern
sense, and, a fortiori, it is not, then, a deductive closure of a set of axioms. Hence, it is
not a closed system, in the modern logical sense of this term. Still, it is not a simple collec-
tion of results, nor a mere general insight. It is rather a well-framed system, endowed with a
codified language, some basic assumptions, and relatively precise deductive rules. And this
system is also closed in another sense [Jullien 2006, 311–312], since it has sharp limits fixed
by its language, its basic assumptions, and its deductive rules. In what follows, especially in
Section 2, I shall better account for some of these limits, namely for those relative to its
ontology. More specifically, I shall describe this ontology as being composed of objects
available within this system, rather than objects that are required or purported to exist
by force of the assumptions that this system is based on and of the results proved within
it. This makes EPG radically different from modern mathematical theories (both formal
and informal). One of my claims is that Descartes’s geometry partially reflects this feature
of EPG.2
Both in the early modern age and earlier, EPG was the subject of many critical discus-
sions. Still, these were generally not aimed at questioning it, but rather focused on its inter-
pretation, assessment, and systematization. One might even say that EPG constitutes the
unquestioned core of classical geometry (as I suggest calling pre-Cartesian geometry as a
whole). A crucial concern of classical geometry was extending EPG, that is, looking for
appropriate ways to do geometry outside its limits. These efforts did not produce a closed1 My restriction to plane geometry is not intended to imply that plane geometry is sharply distinct
from solid geometry for Euclid, or that this is so for the successive mathematicians up to Descartes.
This restriction merely depends on the fact that some of the claims I shall make about plane geometry
would apply to solid geometry only in the case of a number of appropriate specifications, disclaimers,
or adjustments. As the consideration of plane geometry is enough for my purpose,
I prefer then to limit myself to it, for simplicity. For a number of relevant considerations of the
matter of the relation between plane and solid geometry, I refer the reader to an ongoing paper of
A. Arana and P. Mancosu (whom I thank for sending me some preliminary versions of their paper).
2 If I say that Descartes’s geometry reflects this feature of EPG only partially, it is because of
reasons that depend on Descartes’s geometrical algebra. This is a quite crucial matter, of course, but
it is not directly relevant for my present purpose. Hence, I shall not consider it in the body of my
paper, and only get to it briefly in the Concluding Remarks (Section 4).
44 M. Panza(in the sense specified above) and equally well-framed system as EPG, however, so that clas-
sical geometry appears neither as a single theory, nor as a family of theories, but rather as
quite a fluid branch of studies. This is my second point.
My third and main point is that things are quite different with Descartes’s geometry: this
is a closed system, equally well-framed as EPG. Descartes not only took EPG for granted
[Jullien 1996, 10–11] and based his own geometry on it, but also grounded this last geometry
on a conception of the relations between geometrical objects and constructions that is
structurally similar to that which pertains to EPG. This is the sense in which I say that
Descartes’s extension of EPG is conservative.3
Despite this strict connection between Descartes’s geometry and EPG, many accounts of
the former emphasize its novelties and differences with respect to classical geometry and
project it towards its future, rather than rooting it in its past. Though this is not the case
for Bos’s book4 (which also emphasizes the conservative nature of Descartes’s geometry
[Bos 2001, 411–412]), it seems to me that something more should be said on the relation
between Descartes’s geometry and classical geometry.
I hold that Descartes’s geometry is better understood if its structural affinities with EPG
are pointed out. Also, if this is done, its crucial novelties may, at least partially, be
accounted for as the quite natural outcome of an effort to extend EPG and get a closed
and equally well-framed system.
When things are viewed this way, Descartes’s primary purpose in geometry appears to be
a foundational one, and his addressing the exactness concern appears as a crucial ingredient
of this purpose. This does not appear to be Bos’s understanding. He rather maintains that
the “primary aim” of the Géométrie “was to provide a general method for geometrical
problem solving” [Bos 2001, 228]. I do not deny that solving geometrical problems was a
pivotal concern for Descartes. Still, I argue that it naturally arose within his foundational
program. I have just said (and I shall try to justify later) that Descartes’s geometry partially
reflects the crucial feature of EPG that I account for by describing its ontology as com-
posed of objects available within it (rather than of objects that are required or purported
to exist). In my mind, this is enough to explain why Descartes was mainly concerned with
the solution of geometrical problems without arguing that the Géométrie was primarily
written to present a method for geometric problem-solving (however suitable and general
this method could have appeared to him).
This viewhas another important consequence. The “generalmethod for geometrical problem
solving” that Bos refers to is certainly not to be confusedwith themethod “of correctly conduct-
ingone’s reasonand seeking truth in the sciences” that theGéométrie is famously supposed to be
an essay of Descartes [1637]; Descartes [AT], IV; Descartes [DMML]. This last method is, even
morefamously,basedontheclarityanddistinctnessprecept[Descartes1637,20,34,39;Descartes
[AT], VI, 18, 33, 38; Descartes [DMML], 17, 29, 33]. This makes it quite natural to think that
Descartes’s concern for geometrical exactness is the geometrical aspect of his quest for clarity3 This sense is highly informal. In Section 2.3, I shall clarify it a little bit more. In footnote 68, I shall
briefly consider, instead, the question of whether Descartes’s geometry can be said to be a
conservative extension of EPG in a closer sense to the technical one which is usual in modern logic.
4 Another notable exception is a classical paper of Molland [1976]. Despite many local affinities
and a common emphasis on foundations, the views defended in this paper are, however, quite
different from those I shall argue for.
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would imply it if itwereadmitted(as it isnatural todo) that, forDescartes,clarityanddistinctness
are necessary ingredients of the quest for truth and certainty. Namely, Bos argues that “for
Descartes theaimofmethodical reasoningwas tofind truthand certainty,” and that“in geomet-
rical context thisquestconcernedwhat I refer toby the term‘exactness’” [Bos2001,229]. I cannot
discuss thismatter here. But I nevertheless observe that if, forDescartes, exactnesswere the geo-
metrical counterpart of clarity and distinctness, then clarity and distinctness in geometry could
not bemerely amatter of rational conceivability, but should be strictly intertwinedwith the sat-
isfaction of constructive requirements that, as I shall show later, directly derive from Euclid’s.
The present Introduction aside, the paper includes two main sections followed by some
Concluding Remarks.
Section 2 outlines the exactness concern with respect to classical geometry, and accounts
for the way it would have appeared to Descartes. For this purpose, I come back to some
known material that has been enlighteningly analyzed by Bos, by emphasizing some aspects
of it. In Section 2.1, I distinguish exactness from precision, and also introduce some terminol-
ogy that I shall use later. Section 2.2 is devoted to EPG, by particularly emphasizing the role
that problems and constructions have in it. This role explains why a conservative extension of
EPG requires the admission of new sorts of constructions and new tools for solving problems.
Section 2.3 offers different examples of the way classical geometry extended EPG. This allows
me to distinguish six different sorts of constructions not admitted within EPG.
Section 3 accounts for Descartes’s views on exactness.6 The matter is introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1, by considering Descartes’s attitude to the mean proportionals problem. Section 3.2
then provides a systematic account of his characterization of geometrical curves, whereas
Section 3.3 accounts for Descartes’s different attitudes toward the six different sorts of con-
structions distinguished in Section 2.3.
Finally, the concluding Section 4 briefly accounts for some structural similarity and
essential differences between Descartes’s geometry and EPG.2. The exactness concern
2.1. Exactness norms
The exactness concern for classical geometry was not a matter of accuracy. Accuracy was
certainly a requirement for practical or applied geometry, but the exactness requirement5 The conceptual and methodological relations between the Discours de la Méthode and the
Géométrie are far from simple and I cannot enter into this matter here. I only observe that in
Descartes’s correspondence one finds evidence for arguing both that he considered them to be
strictly connected, and that he took them to be relatively independent. As examples, I quote a
passage from a letter to Mersenne from the end of December 1637 and another from a letter to
Vatier from February 22th 1638. “In the Dioptrique and the Météores I merely tried to persuade
[someone] that my Method is better than the usual one; in my Géométrie, however, I claim to have
demonstrated this” [Descartes [AT], I, 478; I slightly modify the translation of The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes: Descartes [PWC], 77–78]. “I could not demonstrate the use of [. . .][my]
method in the three treatises that I gave, because it prescribes an order for searching things which is
quite different from that I thought to have to use for explaining them” [Descartes [AT], I, 559; again,
I slightly modify the translation of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Descartes [PWC], 85].
6 On this matter, I also refer the reader to Panza [2005, 23–43].
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geometry, it was required to perform some (material) procedures with a sufficient degree
of precision, in pure geometry it was required to argue in some licensed ways. This is what
the exactness concern was about. In order to better explain this matter, I need a convenient
terminology.
I use the term ‘concept’ for short, to refer to what should be more precisely called ‘sortal
concepts’. In philosophical literature, there is no general agreement about the intrinsic nat-
ure of concepts. Still, it is widely admitted that, whatever concepts might be, sortal concepts
should be such that the assertion that some objects fall or do not fall under them is mean-
ingful. Moreover, it is also widely admitted that each sortal concept is characterized if and
only if two kinds of conditions are attached to it: its application conditions and the identity
conditions of the objects that are purported to fall under it. The former are necessary and
sufficient conditions for an object to fall under this concept: an object meets them if and
only if it falls under this concept. The latter are necessary and sufficient conditions for
the objects that fall under this concept to be distinct from each other: if a and b are objects
that fall under it, a is the same object as b if and only if these conditions are met.8
Fixing the former kind of conditions for a certain concept is possibly not enough to fix
the latter kind of conditions. Moreover, this is possibly not enough to provide either a war-
rant that some objects actually fall under this concept or appropriate norms for obtaining
some objects which do. Again, fixing both kinds of conditions is possibly not sufficient to7 I emphasize that the question concerns pure geometry in order to make the distinction between
accuracy and exactness clearer. From now on, I shall avoid this specification and take it for granted
that ‘geometry’ refers to pure geometry.
8 A simple example can be useful to better explain this notion. Suppose that somebody, let us say
Ann, is looking to the sky and is willing to describe what she is seeing. She would presumably appeal
to the sortal concept of star. She would then say that some of the things she is seeing are stars, i.e.,
objects that fall under this concept. If Ann wanted to be really precise in what she is saying, she
should be able to explain what makes something a star. Stating it would be the same as stating the
application conditions of the concept of star. But this would still not be enough, since Ann should
also be able to explain what makes one of the stars that she is seeing now the same as one of those
that she was seeing yesterday. Stating it would be the same as stating the identity conditions of stars.
If Ann were actually able to do both things, she would posses the sortal concept of star. But suppose
now that, among the things that Ann is seeing, there was one that she cannot recognize very well. She
could then wonder whether this was a flying saucer. Regardless of whether she would conclude that
this was so or not, in order to be really precise in what she was thinking, Ann should also have in
mind appropriate application conditions for the concept of flying saucer, and possibly also identity
conditions for flying saucers. The appropriateness of these conditions would not depend of course
on the actual existence of flying saucers (more than that, if these conditions, or at least the former of
them, were not appropriate, it would be impossible to rightly conclude that flying saucers do not
exist, in fact). This should be enough for making clear that it is not necessary that some objects
actually fall under a sortal concept for a certain sortal concept to be clearly identified as such. What
matters is only that the assertion that some objects fall or do not fall under it be meaningful and that
the application and identity conditions be fixed, as said above. A last remark, for completeness. The
question of whether and how one could appropriately distinguish sortal concepts from nonsortal
ones is quite complex, and philosophical literature displays no general agreement about it. But this
does not matter for my purpose, since I use the term ‘concept’ only to refer to sortal concepts, as I
have clarified above.
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the geometrical concepts involved in classical geometry.
Consider an example. For the sake of simplicity, it pertains to EPG, but it is evoked here
to account for some features of classical geometry as a whole. What I shall say about it in
the present Section is thus intend to apply, mutatis mutandis, to all classical geometry. I shall
specifically consider EPG in the following Section 2.2.
Definitions I.19–20 of the Elements fix the application conditions of the concept of equi-
lateral triangle. They do it by stating that equilateral triangles are rectilinear figures con-
tained by three equal segments9 (I understand this statement this way: an object falls
under the concept of equilateral triangle if and only if it is a rectilinear figure contained
by three equal segments). These same definitions do not provide, however, identity condi-
tions for the objects that possibly fall under this concept. Moreover, they provide neither a
warrant that some objects actually fall under it nor appropriate norms for obtaining some
such objects. One might then doubt that these definitions would be enough to define equi-
lateral triangles.
As a matter of fact however, in classical geometry, fixing the application conditions of a
certain concept—a geometrical concept of course (that is, a concept under which geomet-
rical objects are purported to fall)—was considered to be enough to define such objects. For
example, Definitions I.19–20 of the Elements were taken to be enough to define equilateral
triangles (in what follows, I will conform with this attitude and use accordingly the verb ‘to
define’ and its cognates).
Once a definition such as this was offered, it was still necessary to provide the identity
conditions of the relevant objects, and a warrant that some objects fall under the relevant
concept, and/or some norms for obtaining some such objects. Returning to our example,
one might think that providing this warrant in this case would have been the same as ensur-
ing that the equilateral triangles exist. But this is not so in fact, at least if it is admitted (as it
is usual in modern mathematics) that, for a concept P, the Ps exist only insofar as they form
a fixed domain of quantification and individual reference. This means that admitting (or
supposing) that the Ps exist is taken to license both asserting that some appropriate condi-
tions are obtained for all of them taken individually (for example, that all, taken individu-
ally, enjoy a certain property), and denoting each one, or at least some of them, with an
appropriate singular term that rigidly refers to it (which entails that appropriate identity
conditions are available for them).10
This way of conceiving the existence of objects of a certain sort is quite natural, I think. It
is then natural to assert that the equilateral triangles that EPG is about (i.e., the objects that
are purported to fall under the concept whose application conditions are fixed by Defini-
tions I.19–20 of the Elements) do not exist.11 A simple reflection should convince us of that.9 For my use of the term ‘segment,’ cf. footnote 15.
10 A simple example of this way of thinking is the following: admitting (or supposing) that the
natural numbers exist is taken to licence both asserting that they form a progression, and denoting
one of them with the term ‘1’ which refers to the same natural number in any one of its occurrences
(note that saying that asserting that p is licensed does not mean that p is warranted to be true, but
just that it is ensured that the assertion that p is meaningful).
11 Notice that to say that the Ps do not exist is not the same as saying that no particular object
falling under P can exist, or that no such object exists in a certain context. By ‘the Ps do not exist’ I
merely mean that there is nothing like a definite totality of all the Ps in the sense just explained. This
point will become clearer, I hope, on the basis of the following considerations.
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of Proposition I.1 of the Elements, which asks one to construct an equilateral triangle on a
given segment. Suppose now that somebody were asking whether they, by doing this, were
speaking of the same equilateral triangle. More generally, suppose that such a somebody
were asking under which conditions one could speak of the same equilateral triangle on dif-
ferent occasions, by relating some EPG arguments. It seems obvious to me that both these
questions are ill-posed, since EPG runs perfectly even if no way to answer them is provided.
More than that, there is no clear sense in which one could fix the reference of a singular
term for equilateral triangles in the language of EPG (for example, ‘ABC’) in such a way
that it be taken to refer to the same equilateral triangle in any one of its occurrences.
For this same reason, it is inappropriate to assert that all the equilateral triangles that
EPG is about, taken individually, enjoy a certain property.12
What does itmean, then, in this as in other cases relative to classical geometry, that awarrant
that some objects actually fall under a certain concept (appropriately defined) is provided?
This means that it has been shown how to put one or several such objects (distinguished from
eachother) at the disposal of amathematician doing geometry for the purpose of producing an
argument about them. Now, in classical geometry, this is done in such a way that it makes no
sense to wonder whether the objects of this sort that a certain argument is about are or are not
the same as other objects that another, independent argument is about.
Consider our example again. The warrant that some objects actually fall under the concept
of equilateral triangle is provided by the solution of Proposition I.1 of the Elements. I shall
better explain this point later, since this explanation requires a distinction between two kinds
of geometrical concepts involved in EPG that I have not introduced yet. For the time being,
the only relevant point is that this solution exhibits a procedure, namely a construction, that
applies to any given segment and results in an equilateral triangle having this segment as a
side. Hence, if a segment is at the disposal of a mathematician doing EPG, it is enough for
her/him to apply this procedure in order to also have at her/his disposal an equilateral triangle
(having this segment as a side). In my parlance, this ensures that some objects fall under the
concept of equilateral triangle, though this does not prove, of course, that equilateral triangles
exist in the sense explained above. I also doubt that there is some other clear sense in which
one can say that this proves that the equilateral triangles exist. At most, after having con-
structed it, one can say that a particular equilateral triangle is brought into existence. But
then, one should also admit that this triangle exists only in the context of the argument in
which this construction is involved, since no clear condition is provided for ensuring that this
same triangle also occurs in another, independent argument.
The same happens for the objects falling under any other geometrical concept involved
in classical geometry. For short, I use the verb ‘to obtain’ to mean the action of putting
some objects that fall under a certain concept (whose application conditions have been
appropriately fixed) at the disposal of a mathematician for the purpose of producing an
argument about them. This explains what I mean by speaking, with respect to classical
geometry, of norms for obtaining such objects. They are norms that the procedures to be
followed for obtaining these objects (that is, for putting them at the disposal of a mathema-
tician for the purpose of producing an argument about them) have to comply with in order12 This does not mean of course that EPG does not include universal statements about certain sorts
of objects. The contrary is true: theorems in EPG are just such statements. Still, according to me, a
theorem in EPG does not state that all the objects of a certain sort, taken individually, enjoy a
certain property. I shall better explain this point at the end of Section 2.2.
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certain concept, one has to show how to obtain some objects that fall under this concept
through a procedure that complies with these norms.
Consider, once more, our example. The procedure exhibited by the solution of Proposi-
tion I.1 is licensed within EPG because it obeys some constructive clauses explicitly stated
in the Elements, and takes advantage, in a way that is implicitly allowed, of the physical
properties of the relevant diagrams. It is then licensed because it complies with some norms
explicitly stated or implicitly admitted in the Elements. These are norms for obtaining some
objects falling under a certain concept. Namely, they are those that are proper to EPG.
In my view, the exactness concern for classical geometry was essentially that of providing
norms such as these. This is why I suggest calling them ‘exactness norms’.
Those proper to EPG were quite clearly identified. But this was not so for classical geom-
etry in general. Not only did different geometers adopt quite different such norms, but also
very often these norms were left implicit, or made explicit in a way open to different under-
standings. One of the aspects under which Descartes’s geometry is an extension of EPG is
that it includes appropriate exactness norms licensing obtaining some geometrical objects
that cannot be obtained according to the exactness norms proper to EPG. The way that
these norms are stated is also open different understandings, however. Bos’s book is a
major contribution to the effort of fixing the most appropriate and plausible understanding.
In the present paper, especially in Section 3, I shall also try to contribute to this effort.2.2. Problems in Euclid’s plane geometry
In EPG, problems ask for constructions, and they are solved insofar as these constructions
are performed. These are constructions of objects that are required to fall under some spec-
ified concepts.More precisely, inEPGeachproblem is a demand that one ormore objects pur-
porting to fall under one or more concepts be constructed. For short, I say that a problem
which asks for the construction of an object falling under a certain concept is concerned with
this concept. The main purpose in stating problems in EPG is thus, in my parlance, that of
providing an appropriate specification of the concepts they are concerned with.
The objects that EPG is about, or EPG objects, as I shall say from now on, are points,
segments, circles, angles,13 and polygons of distinct sorts.14 The relative concepts are intro-13 I use the term ‘angle’ to refer, in general, to rectilinear angles or angles formed by a segment and a
circle or two circles. For short, when I use this term to refer to a particular angle, I shall intend that it
is a rectilineal one.
14 The objects that EPG is about, or EPG objects, are, of course, objects that are purported to fall
under concepts whose application conditions may be fixed using the language of EPG. The inverse
implication does not hold, however. A simple example is enough to explain why. According to
Definition I.15 of the Elements, “a circle is a plane figure contained by a line such that all the straight
lines falling upon it from one point among those lying inside such a figure are equal to one another”
(I slightly modify Heath’s translation [Euclid [ECH], I, 153 and 183]). It is enough to slightly modify
this definition in order to define ellipses (or to fix the application conditions of the concept of
ellipse). It is clear however that ellipses are not objects that EPG is about. Something similar can also
be said for parabolas and hyperbolas, and many other curves other than circles. I prefer then to say
explicitly that EPG objects are points, segments, circles, angles, and polygons of distinct sorts. More
precisely, according to my use of the term ‘EPG object,’ for a geometrical object to be an EPG one, it
is enough that it is a point, a segment, a circle, an angle, or a polygon of some sort.
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offered an example above. This concerns the concept of equilateral triangle. To fix its appli-
cation conditions, two other concepts are invoked: that of segment and that of figure (since
a triangle is a polygon, and polygons are taken to be figures). These are introduced through
Definitions I.2, I.4, and I.13–14 of the same Elements. These definitions are much less clear
than Definitions I.19–20, and have been the object matter of innumerable comments and
discussions. Still, for my present purpose, the subtleties involved in them do not matter.
What matters is rather that, in order to state the application conditions of the concept
of equilateral triangle, Euclid appeals to the concepts of segment and figure, and supposes
it to be clear what is meant for three segments to be equal and to contain a figure.15 This is a
simple example of the practice of introducing a concept by appealing to other concepts
already introduced. The concepts of point, segment, circle, angle, and other kinds of poly-
gons are also introduced in this way.16
Some problems in EPG are concerned with concepts such as these. But this is not the
case of all EPG problems.17 Many of them (the majority of them, actually) are concerned,
instead, with concepts that differ from these insofar as the objects that are purporting to fall
under them are required to stay in some appropriate relation with other given objects. To
appreciate the difference, compare, for example, the concept of square with that of square
equal to a given rectangle or to a given circle. Of course, a square equal to a given rectangle
or to a given circle is a square, but it should be immediately clear that asking for the con-
struction of a square equal to a given rectangle or to a given circle is quite different from
asking for the construction of any square (i.e., of a square having any arbitrary segment as
its side).15 Definitions I.2, I.4, and I.13–14 are well known, but I quote them for the reader’s benefit.
According to Definition I.2, “a line is breadthless length”; according to Definition I.4, “a straight line
is that which lies evenly with respect to the points on itself”; according to Definition I.13, “a
boundary is that which is an extremity of anything”; finally, according to Definition I.14, “a figure is
that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries” (I quote Heath’s translations, slightly
modifying that of Definition I.4 [Euclid [ECH], I, 153, 158, 165, and 182]). Only two simple remarks
are appropriate for my present purpose. The former is that straight lines are generally finite, for
Euclid, and this is the reason that I refer to them as segments. The latter is that the notion of being
contained by something, which is involved in the definition of equilateral triangle, is already
involved in the definition of figures, to the effect that, if Definitions I.13–14 are taken to be clear,
what matters, in order to have a clear understanding of the definition of equilateral triangles, is
admitting that three segments can provide a boundary or extremity.
16 One might doubt that this is the case for the concept of point. To see that this is so, it is enough to
remark that Definition I.1 is not enough to fix the application conditions of this concept. Definition
I.3 is also required for that. The former states that “a point is that of which there is no part”; the
latter clarifies this statement, by stating that “the extremities of a line are points” (I quote again
Heath’s translations, slightly modifying that of Definition I.1 [Euclid [ECH], I, 153, 155, and 165]).
17 From now on, I call ‘EPG problems’ those problems that ask for constructions of EPG objects,
by requiring (often implicitly) that these construction comply with the exactness norms proper to
EPG. A usual and compact way to identify these norms consists in saying that they select
constructions by ruler and compass. In this parlance, one could say that EPG problems are those
problems that ask for constructions of EPG objects by ruler and compass. In what follows, I shall
try to account for the exactness norms proper to EPG in a more precise way, and I shall also explain
why I prefer to use a different terminology.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 51I shall come back to this distinction later. For the time being, it is only important to observe
that—with only the exception of arbitrary segments and points, which provide the starting
point of any construction licensed within EPG (as I shall explain later)—solving a problem
is the onlyway available in EPG forwarranting that some objects fall under a certain concept,
independently of whether this concept is of the former kind or the latter. Construction is thus
the typical modality through which geometrical objects are obtained in EPG, and to claim
that some objects fall under a certain concept is, in EPG, the same as claiming that some
objects falling under this concept can be constructed in the appropriate way.
Accordingly, the sense in which it can be said, in EPG, that some objects fall under a cer-
tain concept is manifested by the way in which EPG problems are solved. This also displays
the identity conditions of EPG objects, and the exactness norms relative to them. A good
way (the only way, in fact) to understand this sense and become aware of these conditions
and norms is, then, by parsing the solutions of EPG problems. This is what I shall briefly do
in the rest of the present section.
EPG constructions require that appropriate diagrams be drawn. More than that: they
are just procedures for drawing diagrams in a licensed way, to the effect that an EPG prob-
lem is solved when appropriate diagrams, representing some objects falling under the con-
cepts this problem is concerned with, are so drawn, or imagined to have been drawn. I term
constructions like these ‘diagrammatic.’1818 Proposition I.1 of the Elements invoked above provides a very simple example. As written, it asks
for the construction of an equilateral triangle on a given segment. In its solution, this segment is
identified with that which is represented by a certain stroke. Nothing compels someone who is
performing or expounding this solution to actually draw this stroke, of course. But the mere phrase
‘let AB be the given segment’ with which this solution begins (I quote Heath’s translation, slightly
modifying it [Euclid [ECH], I, 241]) is understable only insofar as a stroke representing a certain
segment is imagined, if not actually drawn. This is because the way for identifying a single particular
segment within EPG is by taking it to be the segment represented by a certain stroke. Hence, the
stroke (either actually drawn or imagined) is needed to fix the reference of the singular terms ‘AB,’
‘A,’ and ‘B’ [Netz 1999, 19–26]. Once this reference is fixed, the construction can begin. One
“describes” two circles with radius AB: one with center A, the other with center B. Usually this goes
with the actual drawing of two contour-closed lines passing respectively through the two extremities
of the stroke representing the given segment, and representing these circles, in turn. Once more, this
is not compulsory. But it is at least necessary to imagine these lines. This is all the more evident
because the construction continues by observing that these circles meet in a point C, which, so to say,
pops up, because of the physical properties of the lines that have been drawn or imagined. This point
is, indeed, represented by the intersection of these lines, which provides the reference for the singular
term ‘C.’ Then, this point is “joined” with A and B, respectively, which usually goes with the actual
drawing of two new strokes that provide the actual reference of the new singular terms ‘CA’ and
‘CB.’ Again, these can be only imagined. But whether they are actually drawn or only imagined, they
are needed in order to fix the reference of the other singular term that is supposed to denote the
equilateral triangle that is constructed this way. What I refer to by the term ‘diagram’ is just the
system composed of the three strokes representing the sides of this triangle and the two contour-
closed lines whose intersection represents the point C. Of course, one can deny that Euclid’s solution
involves three particular single segments, a particular circle, and a particular equilateral triangle, and
then that ‘AB,’ ‘A,’ ‘B,’ etc. have to be understood as genuine singular terms. One can think, rather,
that this solution concerns the very concepts of segment, circle, and equilateral triangle, or
something like the corresponding schemas. Alternatively, one can think that ‘AB,’ ‘A,’ ‘B,’ etc. are
genuine singular terms referring to abstract objects implicitly defined by the deductive rules that
52 M. PanzaThe verb ‘to represent’ evokes a complex relation. I only emphasize here that diagrams
provide the identity conditions of the objects they represent. This means that, within an
argument concerned with several EPG objects, these are distinct insofar as they are repre-
sented, or supposed to be represented, by distinct diagrams or subdiagrams.19
A natural question arises then: how do diagrams differ from each other in EPG? It is not
easy to answer, in general. For example, there is no clear response to the question of
whether one can draw the same diagram twice, that is, whether diagrams are tokens or
types.20 I prefer to consider them as tokens. But, for my present argument, this is not essen-
tial. What matters is that considering them as tokens and admitting that, in a single
diagram, different appropriate subdiagrams represent different objects allows for the con-
ducting of EPG arguments (some possible unimportant exceptions apart).21 In other terms,
EPG works perfectly (these exceptions aside) if the diagrams involved in it are considered
as tokens.22 The only identity conditions that diagrams confer to EPG objects are thus
local—that is, relative to single arguments—and no other identity conditions for geometri-
cal objects are available in EPG. It follows that EPG objects do not form a fixed domain of
quantification and individual reference, in the sense explained in Section 2.1: they are notterms like those submit to, and that diagrams enter into Euclid’s arguments only as a convenient but
nonessential visual support of a completely independent syntax. I cannot argue here against these
interpretations, which I think to be simply unfaithful to Euclid’s text and to the way it has been
understood in classical geometry. I limit myself to adhering to another view (which is quite common,
in fact), and to emphasizing the role that, according to this view, one has to confer to diagrams
within EPG. For more details on this matter, I cannot but refer the reader to another paper of mine:
Panza [TRD]. For a survey of the recent discussion on the role of diagrams in Euclid’s geometry
updated to 2008, cf. also Manders [2008].
19 For connoisseurs, I add that I take EPG objects to be quasi-concrete ones in Parsons’s sense
[Parsons 2008, Sect. 7 and Ch. 5]. These are abstract objects “distinguished by the fact that they have
an intrinsic relation to the concrete” (which he also calls ‘representation’), to the effect that they are
“determined” by some concrete objects which provide “concrete embodiments” of them (ibid. 33).
This does not entail that the identity conditions of quasi-concrete objects are those of their concrete
counterparts. This is typical of EPG objects, in my view.
20 In philosophical literature, the distinction types/tokens is, broadly speaking, that between an
abstract object conceived as a general template, and its particular instances, the things that are taken
to satisfy this template. A very nice example is offered by L. Wetzel in her article on this matter in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/). Take
G. Stein’s verse in her poem Sacred Emily: ‘Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.’ How many words
are there in it? One can answer that there are three words: ‘rose,’ ‘is,’ and ‘a’. But one can also say
that there are ten words, since ‘rose’ has four occurrences, and ‘is’ and ‘a’ three occurrences each. In
the former case, one is counting types; in the latter, one is counting tokens. In the same way, one can
also say that the concrete inscription of Stein’s verse that the reader has in front of her/his eyes is a
token whose type is this verse itself. The question concerning EPG diagrams is then whether one
should take the term ‘diagrams’ to refer to concrete inscriptions made on concrete sheets of paper or
on some other supports, or to refer to some template of which these inscriptions are instances.
21 Exceptions occur in some very particular cases such as when, for practical convenience,
throughout the course of a single argument, a diagram is reproduced several times under the
convention that it remains the same, or represents the same objects.
22 Of course, nothing would forbid one to consider, for example, that each reformulation of the
solution of Proposition I.1 involved different instances of the same diagram. The point is that this
would be a useless convention, a convention that is not required for EPG to work. Hence, it would
not be part of it, but imposed on it from outside.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 53pieces of basic furniture, somehow steady so that geometers might refer to them individu-
ally, using appropriate terms endowed with a rigid reference. They are merely objects that
fall under some concepts and enter into particular arguments insofar they are represented,
or supposed to be represented, by appropriate diagrams. And each time one wants to refer
individually to some of them within a new argument, they have to be obtained, or to be
supposed to have been obtained anew, by drawing, or imagining to draw, appropriate
diagrams.
This is a crucial fact about EPG and makes it structurally different from modern math-
ematical theories, as anticipated in the Introduction. But what is even more relevant for my
present purpose is that this makes it so that exactness norms are an essential ingredient of
EPG. Insofar as EPG objects are obtained by construction, these are norms for performing
constructions. Hence, to account for them, we have to consider how constructions work in
EPG.
I have just said that constructions in EPG are diagrammatic. This means that the clauses
they obey (i.e., the stipulations licensing their successive steps) are nothing but rules for
drawing diagrams and for ascribing to them the power of representing certain geometric
objects having certain relations to one another. Different systems of such clauses corre-
spond to different sorts of diagrammatic constructions. The constructions entering into
EPG obey a system of clauses such as these, either explicitly stated in the Elements (essen-
tially through Postulates I.1, I.2, and I.3), or implicitly but systematically admitted.23 These
constructions are usually termed ‘by ruler and compass.’ Still, rulers and compasses do not
occur in Euclid’s exposition. This name rather depends on a particular understanding which
is an essential ingredient of Descartes’s geometry. Hence, I prefer to use it only for account-
ing for this last understanding. For a more neutral use, I suggest terming these construc-
tions ‘elementary.’ Using this parlance, one can then say that EPG exactness norms
reduce to a general requirement according to which an EPG object is obtained if and only
if it is represented by a diagram that has been drawn, or at least imagined as having been
drawn,24 according to the clauses of elementary constructions.
This is equivalent to adding a supplementary condition to the problems advanced in
EPG, a condition that characterizes EPG problems in general.25 Hence, solving such a
problem is more than constructing some appropriate objects; it is constructing these objects
through an elementary construction. This is then more than providing a warrant that some23 The simple example considered in footnote 18 provides a clear illustration of some of these
norms. Insofar as Proposition I.1 is the first proposition of the Elements, the mere fact that the
construction entering into its solution starts with the admission that a stroke representing a segment
is drawn (or imagined to be drawn) shows that constructions in EPG can begin with such an
admission. This is a first implicit constructive clause (better, it is a particular case of a more general
constructive clause to which I shall come back later). The second step in the construction—the
description of the two circles of radius AB represented by two contour-closed lines passing
respectively through the two extremities of this stroke—obeys another clause, explicitly stated by
Postulate I.3. These contour-closed lines cut each other. A third constructive clause, implicit again,
allows taking their intersection as representing a point that is ipso facto constructed insofar as these
two circles are so. The last step—in which this point is joined respectively to the points A and B by
two segments represented by two new strokes—obeys a further clause, explicitly stated by Postulate
I.1. Finally, a last implicit clause allows taking the system of the three previous strokes as a
representation of a triangles that is then proved to be equilateral.
24 Cf. footnote 18.
25 Cf. footnote 17.
54 M. Panzaobjects fall under the relevant concepts; it is proving that objects falling under these con-
cepts can be so constructed, that is, that they are available within EPG, as I suggest to say.26
To better clarify this point, one has to remark that, as anticipated above, EPG problems
are concerned with two kinds of concepts. The former, which I term ‘unconditional,’ are
such that the objects that fall under them are not required to stay in some appropriate rela-
tion with other given objects. This is the case, for example, of the concepts of point, seg-
ment, equilateral triangle, or square. The latter, which I term ‘conditional,’ are such that
the objects that fall under them are required to stay in some appropriate relation with other
given objects. This is the case, for example, of the concepts of point cutting a given segment
in extreme and mean ratio, of segment perpendicular to another given segment, of equilat-
eral triangle equal to another given triangle, of square equal to a given rectangle, or to a
given circle. For short, I also term geometrical objects ‘unconditional’ or ‘conditional’
according whether they are purported to fall under unconditional or conditional concepts,
respectively.
Suppose that PU is an unconditional concept, for example, the concept of square, and PC
a conditional concept specifying PU in some way, for example, the concept of square equal
to a given circle. From the fact that unconditional objects falling under PU are available
within EPG it does not follow, of course, that conditional objects falling under PC also
are so. The opposite holds, instead: conditional objects falling under PC are available within
EPG only if unconditional objects falling under PU are so. Hence, one could say that the
basic ontology of EPG is formed by unconditional objects available within it, whereas
the relational arrangement of this ontology depends on which conditional objects are avail-
able within it.
To appreciate the significance of this distinction it is essential to clarify what is meant in
the language of EPG by saying that a certain object is given. The verb ‘to give [didxli],’
especially its past participle ‘given’ (that is, the different forms of the aorist passive parti-
ciple, in Greek), is typically used in the Elements to indicate the starting stage of a particular
construction. If some objects are said to be given, a particular construction is licensed to
start from them. This means that the diagrams representing the objects to be constructed
have to be drawn starting from those that represent these objects. In the Data, ‘given’ is26 Harari has argued against Zeuthen’s classical “existential interpretation” of Euclid’s construc-
tions [Harari 2003; Zeuthen 1896]. According to her, this interpretation assigns to Euclid three theses
that he does not actually endorse, namely that: (i) “the correspondence between a defined term and
the reality to which it refers cannot be taken for granted, but it rather should be established by
means of proofs” [Harari 2003, 4]; (ii) geometrical constructions are “means of justification, i.e., [. . .]
logical procedure[s] [. . .] aimed at establishing the truth-value of a given content” [ibid., 5]; (iii) they
are also “means of ascertaining an already given content,” that is, “means of instantiating a
universal concept [ibid., 14]. In opposition to (iii), Harari also argues that (iv) for Euclid,
constructions are “positive means contributing content” [ibid.], both insofar as they are “means of
measurement by which quantitative relations are deduced,” and as they exhibit or generate “spatial
relations” [ibid., 1 and 21–22]. I agree that Euclid does not endorse (i)–(iii), if the terms “reality” and
“content” in (i) and (iii), respectively, are taken to refer to something existing in the sense explained
in Section 2.1, and this same last term in (ii) is taken to refer to an existential proposition in this same
sense of ‘existential.’ Still, I also argue that Euclid does actually endorse the view that elementary
constructions aim at establishing that some objects are available within EPG, to the effect that
appropriate singular terms actually refer (and namely refer to such objects), and the corresponding
concepts are actually instantiated (and are namely instantiated by such objects). This is, of course,
perfectly compatible with (iv).
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structed (through an elementary construction) on the basis of some other given ones. I con-
form to this latter use, which is not only more liberal, but also very common in classical
geometry.
Adopting this terminological convention is not enough, however, to answer the natural
question that arises at this point. All the clauses of elementary constructions explicitly sta-
ted in the Elements license construction of some objects supposing that some other objects
are given: Postulate I.1 licenses construction of a segment if two points are given; Postulate
I.2 licenses construction of a given segment (that is, construction of two new segments if a
segment is given); Postulate I.3 licenses construction of a circle if two points (or a segment)
are given. But, if any construction requires that some objects are given beforehand, how can
one construct unconditional objects in EPG? Take again the unconditional concept of equi-
lateral triangle. How can one construct an equilateral triangle as such, that is, an equilateral
triangle without any further specification relative to its relations with some given objects?
And, if it were impossible to construct unconditional objects in EPG, how could one prove
that they are available within EPG, and can then rightfully be taken as given and provide
the starting point of an elementary construction of some other objects?
The answer goes in different stages.
The first consists in admitting that, among the clauses of elementary constructions, there
is one (left implicit by Euclid) that licenses admitting, without any previous proof, that any
(finite) number of arbitrary (i.e., not further specified) and thus unrelated segments is given.
This means that an elementary construction can begin by supposing that any (finite) num-
ber of strokes representing these segments has been freely drawn.27 Besides this, if it has
been shown that, starting with such a stand, an object of a certain sort, or a certain system
of related objects of some sorts can be constructed through an elementary construction,
another such construction can then start (for short) with the admission that an object, a
system of objects, or any (finite) number of arbitrary, and thus unrelated, such objects or
systems of objects are given, and represented by appropriate freely drawn diagrams.28
If this is granted, it is enough to conventionally admit that taking something as the start-
ing stage of an elementary construction entails having constructed it through such a con-
struction, in order to infer that arbitrary segments can be constructed in EPG by force
of this very clause, and this is enough to conclude that unconditional segments are available
with EPG. According to Definition I.3, this also entails that unconditional points are so.2927 A particular case of this clause, involving only one arbitrary segment, is applied in the solution of
Proposition I.1 expounded in footnotes 18 and 23, above. For another example, relative to an
application of this same clause involving three arbitrary segments, cf. footnote 31, below. Also, the
solution of Proposition I.2 that I shall mention later applies this same clause, in the case of two
arbitrary segments. Because of Postulate I.1, one might alternatively admit an analogous clause in
which arbitrary segments are replaced by arbitrary points. The reason that I prefer the former
admission is that Definition I.3 suggests that segments have priority over points in elementary
constructions, since it implies that, if a segment is obtained, two points are also ipso facto so, whereas
a segment is not ipso facto obtained if two points are so.
28 For example, Proposition I.42 of the Elements asks for the construction of a parallelogram equal
to a given triangle and having an angle equal to a given one. This construction starts, then, with the
admission that an arbitrary angle and an arbitrary triangle, unrelated to each other, are given and
represented by appropriate freely drawn diagrams.
29 Cf. footnote 27.
56 M. PanzaThis being stated, the best way to explain how other unconditional objects can be con-
structed in EPG is through examples.
To begin with, take again Proposition I.1 of the Elements. It asks us, as said, to construct
an equilateral triangle on a given segment.30 At first glance, it then seems concerned with a
conditional concept. But this is not so. Say, for short, that each EPG object falling under a
concept P intrinsically includes one or more EPG objects falling under a concept Q if
obtaining one or more objects falling under Q is an inescapable part of obtaining each
object falling under P. Each triangle intrinsically includes three segments, for example.
Hence, Proposition I.1 asks us to construct an object that intrinsically includes some seg-
ments one of which is taken to be given. As this last object is supposed to be arbitrary,
the equilateral triangle that Proposition I.1 asks us to construct is specified only in virtue
of the requirement that one of the objects that it intrinsically includes is an arbitrary given
one. This seems to me to be enough for concluding that this equilateral triangle is arbitrary,
in turn, to the effect that Proposition I.1 asks us to construct an arbitrary equilateral trian-
gle, and is thus concerned with an unconditional concept.
It follows that the solution of this proposition shows that an arbitrary equilateral trian-
gle can be constructed through an elementary construction, and it proves, thus, that (uncon-
ditional) equilateral triangles are available within EPG. This is the only way to prove that
unconditional objects other than segments and points are available within EPG. In other
terms, to prove that this is so, one has to prove that an arbitrary such object can be con-
structed through an elementary construction.
I term ‘ontological’ the function that an EPG problem complies with insofar as its solu-
tion proves that an arbitrary object falling under a certain unconditional concept can be
constructed through an elementary construction, and, thus, that objects falling under this
concept are available within EPG. Propositions I.22 and I.46 provide other examples, since
they prove that generic triangles and squares are available within EPG.31 For circles, things
are much simpler, since Postulate I.3 allows constructing a circle having a given arbitrary
point as center and radii equal to a given arbitrary segment. For angles, things are a little
bit more complicated, but it is enough to admit that the point that in Proposition I.2 is
taken to be given is the extremity of a segment for concluding that the solution of this prop-
osition proves how to construct an angle that could be taken as arbitrary. By solving Prop-
ositions IV.11, IV.15, and IV.16, Euclid shows then, respectively, how to inscribe, through
an elementary construction, a regular pentagon, a regular hexagon, and a regular pentadec-
agon into a given arbitrary circle, which immediately suggests how to construct these reg-30 On the solution of this proposition, cf. footnotes 18 and 23.
31 Notice that the availability of generic triangles within EPG does not immediately follow from the
implicit clause mentioned above about the starting point of an elementary construction. This clause
licences, indeed, admitting, without any previous proof, that three arbitrary, and thus unrelated,
segments are given and represented by three strokes freely drawn. But it does not license the same
for three segments mutually placed to form a triangle. Hence, availability of generic triangles within
EPG needs to be proved, and this is done in solving Proposition I.22. The fact that this proposition
occurs so late in the Elements, and namely after generic triangles have already been considered in
other propositions, could make one to think that it involves a sort of circularity. Still, this circularity
is expository, at most, since the solution of this proposition relies only on Postulate I.3 and the
solution of Proposition I.2 (and the restrictive condition involved in this same proposition could be
avoided if the possibility of stating a problem with an impossible solution in some cases were
admitted).
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hexagons, and pentadecagons are available within EPG.
Come back now to Proposition I.1. It is easy to see that the construction involved in its
solution applies to any given segment (regardless of whether it is arbitrary or not). Hence,
this solution also proves that for any given segment, an equilateral triangle (or better two,
since, though Euclid does not remark on it explicitly, the same construction can be repli-
cated on two opposite sides of the given segment) can be constructed on it through an ele-
mentary construction. This is a new constructive clause for elementary constructions
derived from those already stated or implicitly admitted.33 Let us term ‘constructive’ the
functions that an EPG problem complies with insofar as its solution provides such a proof.
All EPG problems comply with this function, though this is negligible in many cases. In
contrast, the great majority of EPG problems do not comply with the ontological one, since
they are concerned with conditional concepts. Typically, EPG problems complying with the
constructive function but not with the ontological one ask us to construct either conditional
points, or other conditional objects that are ipso facto given or can easily be constructed
though an elementary construction if such points are given.34 Hence, their solutions prove
that these conditional objects can be constructed through an elementary construction and
are thus available within EPG.35
A last remark for completeness, before we turn our backs on EPG. The previous consid-
erations also allow an explanation of the logical nature of theorems in EPG. These are, of
course, universal statements about EPG objects. Still, insofar as these objects do not form a
fixed domain of quantification, as explained above, it is not appropriate to understand them
as claims that all EPG object of a certain sort, taken individually, enjoy a certain property.
In my understanding, they are about objects available within EPG, and state that any given32 Suppose that a regular polygon has been inscribed into a given arbitrary circle. If an arbitrary
segment is given, construct on this segment an isosceles triangle (having the two other sides equal to
each other) similar to the isosceles triangle formed by a side of this polygon and two radii of this circle
(which can be done without appealing to any proportion, merely by constructing appropriate parallel
segments). The vertex of this triangle opposed to the given segment is the center of another circle into
which can be inscribed a polygon similar to the given one and having the given segment as side.
33 Suppose that, in conducting any argument, one is considering a certain segment. Then this new
clause licenses constructing an equilateral triangle on it (or better two) having it as a side, in the
same way as, for example, Postulate I.1 licenses constructing a segment joining two given points.
34 Take Proposition I.9 as an example. It asks us to bisect a given angle, to the effect that its solution
requires that a new angle be constructed within the given one, and, for this to be done, that an
appropriate segment (or straight line) through the vertex of this last angle be constructed. Still,
because of Postulate I.1, the construction of this segment immediately follows from the construction
of an appropriate point (which Euclid identifies with the vertex of an equilateral triangle
constructed, according to the solution of Proposition I.1, on a chord of the given angle). Another
example is given by Proposition I.10, which asks us, instead, to bisect a given segment. Its solution
requires that a new segment be constructed on the given one. But it is quite clear that such a new
segment is ipso facto given if an appropriate point is constructed on the segment originally given.
35 The proof that a conditional object can be constructed through an elementary construction
starting from the relevant given objects could be also seen as the proof that a certain arbitrary
configurations of objects can be so constructed. This does not undermine the distinction between the
ontological and the constructive functions of EPG problems, however, since the fact that some
configurations of geometrical objects are taken as genuine geometrical objects and some are not is
crucial. And it is just on this fact that this difference rests, in the very end.
58 M. PanzaEPG object of a certain sort enjoys a certain property, or better that, if a given EPG object
is of a certain sort, then it enjoys this property. For example, Proposition I.5 of the Elements
does not state, in my view, that all isosceles triangles have the angles at the base equal to
one another, but rather that if an isosceles triangles is given, then its angles at the base
are equal to one another (which is perfectly reflected by its proof which, as is well known,
concerns an arbitrary given isosceles triangle).
2.3. Extending Euclid’s plane geometry before Descartes
Insofar as the only way to prove that EPG objects other than arbitrary segments and
points are available within EPG is by solving problems, there is no general warrant that
EPG objects are available within EPG. And, as a matter of fact, many of them, both uncon-
ditional and conditional, are not. For example, both regular heptagons and squares equal to
given circles are EPG objects (respectively unconditional and conditional), but are not
available within EPG.36 Informally speaking, one can say that conservatively extending
EPG means accepting EPG and just licensing other ways to obtain geometrical objects than
by elementary constructions (which implies that also in the extensions of EPG that are got-
ten this way, geometrical objects are not taken to exist, in the sense explained above, but are
just required to be obtained in some appropriate way). In this sense, the search for construc-
tions of EPG objects not available within EPG was a search for a conservative extension of
EPG. Still, some of these constructions also involved geometrical non-EPG objects (i.e.,
objects that EPG does not take into account, or that are purported to fall under concepts
whose application conditions cannot be stated in the language of EPG). The desire to study
these objects was, also, a motivation for looking for such an extension. In Section 3, I shall
account for the way Descartes pursues this aim. Before that, it is useful to consider some
earlier and more local efforts for solving geometrical problems through various sorts of
nonelementary constructions.
These constructions were still diagrammatic, to the effect that the identity conditions of
the objects obtained though them were also provided by appropriate diagrams. Hence,
these objects no longer formed a fixed domain of quantification and individual reference,
in the sense explained in Section 2.1, and to refer individually to some of them, one had
to obtain, or suppose to have obtained them by drawing, or imagining to draw appropriate
diagrams. Still, some of these objects were defined by describing their construction, to the
effect that their definition already provided a warrant for their availability.
The admission of nonelementary constructions also made it possible to state two sorts of
non-EPG problems. The former includes problems that, like EPG ones, ask us to construct
EPG objects, but, unlike them, do not require this to be done through an elementary
construction. I call them ‘quasi-EPG problems.’ The latter includes problems asking for
the construction of some non-EPG objects, such as curves other than circles (such as in
Pappus’s problem [Pappus [CMH], II, 676–683; Pappus [C7SJ], I, 118–123]), or conditional
EPG objects that are required to stay in some appropriate relations with some given
non-EPG objects (such as in the problem of tangents to conics). I call them ‘strictly
non-EPG problems.’36 The claim that some EPG objects are not available within EPG could appear odd. However, it
seems to me a quite natural way of rendering the hiatus that there is in EPG between definitions and
constructions, which is often rendered (wrongly I think) by saying that defining objects in EPG is
not enough for warranting for their existence.
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problem is of course easily convertible to a quasi-EPG problem by merely omitting the
requirement that the objects be constructed through an elementary construction. Relevant
quasi-EPG problems, however, include only those that either are nonsolvable through an
elementary construction, or at least withstood a solution through an elementary construc-
tion in classical geometry though actually admitting such a solution (a well-known example
is the problem of constructing a regular heptadecagon on a given segment, which was
famously proved to be solvable through an elementary construction only by Gauss: [Zim-
mermann 1796; Gauss 1801, Sect. VII]).
I also suggest distinguishing two sorts of nonelementary constructions that, in classical
geometry, entered into the solution of those problems. The former rely only on EPG
objects, though applying constructive clauses not included among those of elementary con-
structions; the latter rely instead on some non-EPG objects, namely curves other than cir-
cles. Hence, whereas the former include only constructions of EPG objects, the latter
include constructions of such curves. I call the former ‘quasi-elementary constructions’
and the latter ‘strictly nonelementary constructions.’ Quasi-EPG problems are possibly
solvable either through the former or through the latter. Strictly non-EPG ones are possibly
solvable, instead, only through the latter.
Admitting quasi-elementary constructions is the same as extending EPG exactness
norms. An aspect of the exactness concern for early modern geometry was relative to such
a sort of extension, and was thus specifically related to quasi-elementary constructions.
Another aspect of this concern was specifically related, instead, to strictly nonelementary
constructions and was relative to the admission of appropriate exactness norms relative
to curves other than circles.
The distinction between quasi-elementary and strictly nonelementary constructions is
still not enough to account for the variety of constructions that populated classical geom-
etry. For each one of these two sorts of constructions, finer distinctions are possible and
necessary. For many problems of classical geometry, especially for quasi-EPG ones, differ-
ent solutions involving different sorts of constructions were known, indeed. The preference
for one of them over others, or the search for new solutions, essentially different from those
already known, were symptoms of different attitudes towards the exactness concern. In the
first part of the 17th century, many of these attitudes cohabited, being often only locally
motivated, or not motivated at all. When Descartes came to geometry, he faced such a plu-
rality of attitudes. Hence, his views on this topic could and should be understood as reac-
tions to this quite confused state of affairs.
It is not easy, however, to make the relevant distinctions clear without going through
appropriate examples. The purpose of the following Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3 is to offer
these examples by considering different solutions of three classical quasi-EPG problems:
the angle trisection, the two mean proportionals, and the circle-squaring ones.372.3.1. Trisecting an angle
Let us begin with Viète’s solution of the first of these problems [Viète 1593, Prop. IX;
Viète [AAKW], 398; Bos 2001, 167–173]. Let dEBD (Fig. 1) be the angle to be trisected
(Viète’s construction applies regardless of whether it is acute, right, or obtuse). Trace the37 These are also the problems Serfati refers to in order to describe the historical context of
Descartes’s reflections on geometrical exactness: Serfati [1993, 198–204].
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Figure 1. Viète’s solution of the angle trisection problem.
60 M. Panzacircle with radius BE and center B, and the straight line FE such that FG = BE. If BH is the
parallel to FE through B, then dHBD is the third part of dEBD. The proof is easy by consid-
ering the internal angles of the isosceles triangles FBG and GBE.
The straight line FE, i.e., the points G or F, cannot be obtained through an elementary
construction. To license their construction, Viète appeals to a new “postulate,” apt “to sup-
ply the deficiency of geometry.” This is the neusis postulate, which licenses one “to draw a
straight line from any point to any two [given] lines, so that the intercept between them be
any possible determined segment” (I slightly modify Bos’s translation [Bos 2001, 168]; this
significantly differs in turn from Witmer’s [Viète [AAKW], 388]).38 The previous construc-
tion applies this postulate in the case where one of the two given lines is straight and the
other is a circle.
This construction results from a slight modification of that offered by Pappus in his
Mathematical Collection [Pappus [CMH], I, 271–277; Heath 1961, I, 235–237; Knoor
1989, 213–216; Bos 2001, 53–56], which requires, instead, cutting off a segment equal to
a given one between two straight lines.39 Pappus does not appeal to any new postulate,D
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M
Figure 2. Pappus’s solution of the angle trisection problem.
38 For the meaning of the adjective ‘possible [possibili],’ cf. Bos [2001, 168, footnote 4].
39 Let dDBE (Fig. 2) be the angle to be trisected (which is assumed to be acute; if the given angle is
obtuse, an analogous construction provides a trisection of its supplement). Trace EF and FL
respectively perpendicular and parallel to BE. Trace BH such that GH = 2BF. dHBE is the third part of
dDBE. Supposing thatM is the middle point of GH, the proof involves the isosceles triangles HFM and
FBM.
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Figure 3. Pappus’s neusis construction.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 61however. He rather shows how to obtain a neusis by intersection of a circle and a hyperbola.
Let it be requested to trace a straight line through E (Fig. 3) cutting off a segment equal to a
between HK and IJ. Let EA and EC be respectively the parallels to HK and IJ through E.
Trace the circle of center A and radius AL equal to a, and the hyperbola through A with
asymptotes HK and EC. Let D be the intersection point of this circle and this hyperbola.
The parallel EG to AD through E is such that GF ¼ a. To prove it, it is enough to remark
that any point D* on the circle is such that GF ¼ a, if D* F* and G*F* are respectively par-
allel to IJ and AD*, and any point D on the hyperbola is such that GF passes through E, if
DF and GF are respectively parallel to IJ and AD.
A hyperbola is univocally determined if its asymptotes and a point through which it
passes are given. Hence, Pappus’s solution requires admitting that a hyperbola is ipso facto
obtained—so that intersection points of it and some other given lines are obtained in
turn—if it is univocally determined. In classical geometry, this was usual for any conic.
Commandinus’s Latin translation of Pappus’s Collection [Pappus [CMC]] appeared five
years before Viète published his solution. It is thus likely that Viète preferred constructions
based on his new postulate over ones depending on this admission with a full knowledge of
the facts. It is not easy to say why, but some guesses are possible.
To justify his postulate, Viète remarks that Nicomedes “seems to have performed” con-
structions that Viète’s postulate would license, by relying on appropriate conchoids of
straight lines and circles.40 Conchoids of straight lines are defined by Pappus [Pappus
[CMH], I, 242–245] as trajectories of a point P (Fig. 4.1) moving on a straight half-line
OP so that MP remains constant while this line rotates around a fixed point O cutting a40 Viète also appeals to Archimedes, who, in proving Propositions 5–9 of his treatise On spirals,
admits constructions based on neusis [Heath 1897, C–CXXII].
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Figure 4.1. External branch of a conchoid of a straight line.
62 M. Panzafixed straight line MM.41 This foreshadows the possibility of tracing this curve through a
simple instrument composed of three rulers replacing OP, MM, and MP. An analogous
instrument can be used to trace conchoids of circles. For future reference, call these instru-
ments ‘conchoid compasses.’
Like regular compasses and other similar instruments, they can be used in two ways: either
in the tracing way, i.e., by making them trace a curve; or in the pointing way, i.e., by making
them indicate some points (which are then taken to be obtained) under the condition that
some of their elements coincide with some given geometrical objects, or meet some other con-
ditions relative to given objects.42 If an instrument is used in the former way, once a curve is
traced, it can be put away, and this curve taken as constructed. If it is used in the latter way, the
sought-after points can only be indicated by appropriate elements of it. To construct these
points, one has to transpose this indication on the support where the construction is done
through appropriate dots or other diagrammatic marks. This suggests two different sorts
of constructive clauses, licensing respectively obtaining curves by tracing them through
instruments, and obtaining points by using instruments in the pointing way. The former
necessarily pertains to strictly nonelementary constructions; the latter can pertain either to
strictly nonelementary constructions or to quasi-elementary ones.41 This is only the external branch of a conchoid, in fact. To have the entire conchoid, including an
external and an internal branch (Fig. 4.2), one has to take the point P to be on the entire straight line
OP and, so to say, to change sides with respect to O and M while passing through the infinite.
Alternatively, one can take the entire conchoid to be formed by the trajectories of two points P and
Q placed on the straight half-line OP at equal distance from M, on the two sides of it. To have a
conchoid of a circle, it is enough to replace the straight line MM with a circle (Fig. 4.3). For short, in
what follows, I shall use the term ‘conchoid’ to refer only to the external branch of a conchoid of a
straight line.
42 To illustrate the use of conchoid compasses in the pointing way, consider Pappus’s construction
related in footnote 39, above. After having traced EF and FL (Fig. 5.1), one can make use of a
compass whose pole O is brought to coincide with the vertex B of the angle dDBE and whose fixed
rule HK coincides with EF. If the ruler XY, sliding on the other ruler OW, is equal to the double of
BF, it is enough to rotate OW around O until Y comes to be on FL, for OW be in the position that the
segment BH has to take for GH to be equal to 2BF, as required. The same compass is used in the
tracing way if it is so used that, while OW (Fig. 5.2) rotates around O, Y traces the conchoid IJ whose
intersection with FL provides the point H.
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Figure 4.2. Conchoid of a straight line.
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Figure 4.3. Conchoid of a circle.
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Figure 5.1. Using conchoid compasses in the pointing way.
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Figure 5.2. Using conchoid compasses in the tracing way.
64 M. PanzaViète’s postulate avoids instead any appeal to instruments: it appears as a way to license
neusis within quasi-elementary constructions without using instruments in the pointing
way. Viète advances no explicit reason for preferring this attitude. One can guess that he
was pursuing both ontological parsimony and argumentative purity, trying to avoid both
curves other than circles (including conics) and instruments used in the pointing way.2.3.2. Finding two mean proportionals
Viète’s postulate was new, but the purpose of solving quasi-EPG problems through
quasi-elementary constructions was not. Still, in classical geometry, it was customary to
use instruments in the pointing way for this purpose. This attitude is illustrated by Eratos-
thenes’s solution to the two mean proportionals problem. This is related by Pappus [Pappus
[CMH], I, 56–59; Knorr 1986, 211; Knorr 1989, 64–65] and opposed to Menaechmus’s
[Archimedes [OOTH], III, 82–85; Heath 1989, I, 251–255; Knorr 1986, 61–66; Knorr
1989, 94–100; Bos 2001, 38–40], which is famously based, instead, on a strictly nonelemen-
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Figure 6.1. Eratosthenes’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem, stage 1.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 65tary construction involving the intersection of conics, and on the admission that a conic is
ipso facto obtained if it is univocally determined.
The former goes as follows. Let a and b be two given segments (a < b). Let also ABCD,
LMNO, and WXYZ (Fig. 6.1) be three equal rectangular plates of height equal to b (their
length is irrelevant). On each of them trace a diagonal, and mark on AD a length AH equal
to a. Slide LMNO beneathWXYZ (Fig. 6.2) so that LN cutsWZ in some point Q. Trace QY
and produce it up to cut AC in K, AD in H0, and AX produced in E. Slide ABCD beneath
LMNO (Fig. 6.3) until K falls on LO. If H0 coincides with H, stop the procedure. Otherwise,
slide LMNO and AMCD (Fig. 6.4) again until this happens. The two mean proportionals
between a and b are equal to LK and WQ, respectively. The proof is obvious by similarity
of triangles.
One could imagine replacing the plates with genuine geometrical rectangles. But this
would make no relevant difference, since the diagrams representing these rectangles would
then be assumed to move until they reach a position that satisfies a coincidence condition
relative to other diagrams representing some given geometrical objects. This would be a use
of diagrams essentially different from that involved in elementary or in other sorts of non-
elementary constructions, where coincidences are not acknowledged by inspecting moving
diagrams but imposed on fixed diagrams by drawing them.43
A simplification of Eratosthenes’s construction was suggested by Clavius [Clavius 1589,
33; Bos 2001, 72–75]. Let AB (Fig. 8.1) be equal to b, and C be a point on it such that43 Eratosthenes’s instrument could also be used in the tracing way, but the curves traced by it should
then be supposed to move until they reach a position that meets a coincidence condition. The
resulting construction is thus more complicated than both Menaechmus’s and Eratosthenes’s and
presents no advantages over them. This is how one could reason. While the plates slide, the
intersection point G* of AC and HY (Fig. 7) describes an arc of a hyperbola which is fixed under the
variation of the distance LW. If this distance varies while AL remains fixed, the intersection point G
of AC and YQ describes another arc of a hyperbola whose position depends on AL. Let K* be the
intersection point of these two hyperbolas. Trace KY intersecting WZ at Q*. Trace Q*L* parallel to
AC, and LK perpendicular to AX. The positions of points K and K vary with AL. When they come
to coincide, Q and Q* do also. This is the final configuration: the sought-after mean proportionals
are equal to LK and WQ, respectively.
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Figure 6.2. Eratosthenes’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem, stage 2.
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Figure 6.3. Eratosthenes’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem, stage 3.
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Figure 6.4. Eratosthenes’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem, stage 4.
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Figure 7. Using Eratosthenes’s instrument in the tracing way.
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Figure 8.1. Clavius’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 67AC ¼ a. Trace the semicircle of diameter AB and its chord AK through any point K on it.
Let CD and LK both be perpendicular to AB, andM be the intersection point of CD and AK
(possibly extended). Let K*, L*, and M* be the respective positions of K, L, and M such that
AM* = AL*. The sought-after mean proportionals are equal to AM * and AK*. The proof is
immediate by the similarity of triangles ACM*, AL*K*, and ABK*.
Clavius admits that points K*, L*, and M* are obtained but without saying how. They
could be obtained by using an appropriate instrument in the pointing way. Let AP and
AQ (Fig. 8.2) be two rulers, the former of which is fixed and the latter of which rotates
around A. Attach to them three other rulers, CD and LK, both perpendicular to AP, and
BK, perpendicular to AQ, so that: C is fixed on both AP and CD; M slides on both CD
and AQ; L is fixed on LK and slides on AP; K is fixed on BK and slides on both LK and
AQ; and B slides on both AP and BK. If AC ¼ a, and the instrument is so adjusted that
AB ¼ b and AM = AL, the sought-after mean proportionals are equal to AM and AK. To
ensure that AC ¼ a and AB ¼ b, it is enough to evaluate whether A, B, and C coincide with
the extremities of two given segments. But AM and AL cannot be superposed, and the only
way to construct two equal segments that they have to coincide with is by solving the two
mean proportionals problem itself. Hence, to ensure that AM = AL, while using this instru-
ment in solving the problem, one has to measure them, for example, by graduating AP and
AQ, or by equipping the instrument with a graduated disc centered on A. Using such an
QP
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Figure 8.2. Instrument suggested by Clavius’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem.
68 M. Panzainstrument in the pointing way requires then something essentially different from that
which is required for using a conchoid compass this way.
If B is kept fixed on AP, this instrument can only trace a semicircle. But, if B is left to slide
on AP, while AQ rotates, K describes different curves depending on the relation of the
motion of B on AP and the rotation of AQ. If these motions are linked through a ruler pass-
ing through L and attached perpendicular to AQ at a fixed point K0 (Fig. 8.3), K traces a
curve that could enter into a strictly nonelementary construction solving the problem. By
adding other rulers alternatively perpendicular to AP and AQ one gets, then, more complex
compasses famously mentioned in Descartes’s Géométrie. I come back to them in Section
3.1.
Another solution based on a different strictly nonelementary construction is related by
J.B. Villalpando, though possibly due to C. Grienberger [Prado and Villalpando 1596–
1604, III, 289–290; Bos 2001, 75–77]. Let BO and AO (Fig. 9.1) be two given segments such
that BO = 2AO. Trace the semicircles with them as diameters. Let C be an arbitrary point
on the former. Trace the chord OC cutting the latter at D. Take E and G on BO and F on OC
so that OD = EO = EF. Through F, trace GF perpendicular to BO. Let BFO be the locus of FP
Q
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B
Figure 8.3. A modification of the instrument suggested by Clavius’s solution of the two mean
proportionals problem.
X B OA
C
D
E
F
G
H
P
Q
R
S
U
T
V
Y
W
Figure 9.1. Villalpando’s solution of the two mean proportionals problem.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 69generated by C moving on the semicircle BCO. Let PO ¼ b form any angle with BO and let
Q be taken on it, R on BO, and S on BFO so that QO ¼ a, QR is parallel to PB, and RS is
perpendicular to BO. Through O and S, trace the chord OT. Take U and V on BO, and W
and Y on PO so that UO = OS, VO = OT, andWU and YV are parallels to PB. The sought-
after mean proportionals are equal to WO and YO. To prove it, trace EH perpendicular to
OC and remark that OC = 2OD and OF = 2OH, to the effect that OH : EO = OF : OC, and
GO : OF = OF : OC = OC : BO. As S is on the locus, also the proportions RO : OS = OS :
OT = OT : BO hold, and UO and VO are thus two mean proportionals between RO and BO.
The problem of finding two mean proportionals between two given segments a and b can
be reduced to that of finding two mean proportionals between another given segment b and
the fourth proportional a between b, a, and b. Indeed, if n and j are two mean proportionals
between a and b and a : a ¼ n : x ¼ j : y, then x and y are two mean proportionals between
a and b. By exploiting this fact, Villalpando shows how to solve the problem by relying on a
locus like BFO relative to any arbitrary given semicircle, whatever the two given segments a
and b might be.44 It is the locus of a point (F) obtained through an elementary construction
based on the supposition that its generating point (C) is given in an arbitrary position. Vil-
lalpando’s solution can thus be accepted only if it is admitted that a locus of a point is ipso
facto obtained if this point is obtained through an admissible construction based on the
supposition that the generating point of this same locus is given in an arbitrary position.
This is the paradigmatic case of what Bos calls ‘generic point-wise constructions’ [Bos
2001, 343].
But Villalpando’s locus can also be traced using an appropriate instrument. Let IJ
(Fig. 9.2) be a ruler longer than 2b, O its middle point, and B another point on it such that
BO ¼ b. Let IM and JM be two rulers forming a right angle at M. Let OM and BC be two
other rulers also forming a right angle at their intersection point C, and LN and LF be two
further rulers, the former perpendicular to JM and passing through C, and the latter44 This locus is a branch of the sextic curve with equation ðx2 þ y2Þ3 ¼ b2x4, with respect to
orthogonal coordinates of origin O and axis OX, with b ¼ BO [Bos 2001, 76; footnote 33]. The whole
sextic forms a figure of eight including four similar symmetric branches with a common vertical
tangent at O.
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Figure 9.2. Villalpando’s compass.
70 M. Panzaperpendicular to OM and passing through L. While IM and JM rotate, M traces the semi-
circle IMJ, C the semicircle BCO, and F Villalpando’s locus. The proof is easy. Let A be
the middle point of BO, AD the perpendicular to OM through A, and EK the perpendicular
to JM though D. While IM and JM rotate, this last point traces the semicircle ADO, and the
equalities OD = EO = EF are obtained (to prove that EO = EF, remark that LF and FO are
perpendicular to each other and E is the middle point of OL, since D is the middle point of
OC). The problem can thus be solved through a strictly nonelementary construction involv-
ing the curve traced by such an instrument, which, for future reference, I call ‘Villalpando’s
compass’.
2.3.3. Squaring a circle
The availability of such a simple instrument for tracing Villalpando’s locus depends on
its being a locus of a point constructed through an elementary construction starting from
the supposition that the generating point of this locus is given in an arbitrary position (on a
given semicircle on which it is assumed to move). This ensures that any number of arbitrary
points of this curve can be constructed through the same elementary construction. This case
is different from that of curves, any number of specific points of which can be so con-
structed. A well-known example is the quadratrix, famously introduced by Hippias [Heath
1961, I, 225–230], and defined by Pappus [Pappus [CMH], I, 252–253; Knorr 1986, 82; Bos
2001, 40–42] as the trajectory CFG (Fig. 10.1) of the intersection point F of two equal seg-
ments OP and MN, the former of which turns clockwise and uniformly around O starting
from position OC, while the latter goes uniformly down along CO, keeping parallel to its
starting position CB, these motions being so related that the two segments come together
to their final position OA.4545 If segments OP andMN are replaced by two half straight lines OQ andMT moving indefinitely in
the same way, their intersection point traces an infinity of infinite branches with asymptotes parallel
to OA. The central branch is symmetric with respect to OA and its asymptotes are at a distance equal
to 2OC from this straight line. The other branches are symmetric with respect to OR and its
asymptotes are parallel to each other at a distance equal to 2OC.
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Figure 10.1. Quadratrix as defined by Pappus.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 71A way to construct any number of specific points of a quadratrix through an elemen-
tary construction is suggested by Clavius [Clavius 1589, I, 894–918, esp. 896–896; Mancosu
1996, 74–76; Bos 2001, 160–166]. One begins by constructing the intersection point F1;1
(Fig. 10.2) of the bisector OF1;1 of the right angle dCOA and the perpendicular M1;1F1;1
to OC through its middle point M1;1. Then one continues in the same way, by constructing
the intersection points F2;1 and F2;2 of the bisectors OF2;1 and OF2;2 of the angles dCOF1;1
and dF1;1OA and the perpendiculars M2;1F2;1 and M2;2F2;2 to OC through the middle points
M2;1 and M2;2 of M1;1C and OM1;1, respectively. By reiterating this construction, one con-
structs as many points F1;1, F2;1, F2;2, F3;1, F3;2, F3;3, F3;4, etc. as one wants, all belonging to
the quadratrix.
Though these points are specific, for Clavius their construction provides a “geometrical
description” of the corresponding quadratrix that is enough, according to him, for obtain-
ing such a curve if OC is given. If this is admitted, or it is admitted that a quadratrix is
obtained in some way, then it is easy to rely on it for dividing any given angle according
to any rational ratio [Pappus [CMH], I, 284–287; Knorr 1986, 84; Bos 2001, 43–44]. Since
dPOA (Fig. 10.1) is to a right angle as OM is to OC, for any ratio q smaller than 1, any given
angle dRST (Fig. 10.3), and any quadratrix UVX of horizontal axis ST, if WV is the perpen-
dicular to ST through the intersection point V of this quadratrix and the side RS of this
angle, it is cut at Y so that WY is to WV in the ratio q, and YZ is parallel to ST, then
dZST is to dRST in this same ratio.
But quadratrices also famously have another property: the point G at which they cut
their horizontal axis (Fig. 10.1) is such that OC is a mean proportional between the arc
CPA and OG. This is proved by Pappus by reductio ad absurdum [Pappus [CMH], I, 256–
259], and makes it possible to rely on a quadratrix to solve the circle-squaring problem
through a strictly nonelementary construction. Let CPA (Fig. 10.4) be any given arc of a
quarter circle, and CFG the corresponding quadratrix. If GC and CH are mutually perpen-
dicular, OH is equal to the arc CPA. Hence, if B is the middle point of OC, the rectangle
HOBK is equal to the quarter circle CPAO.
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Figure 10.3. Dividing an angle according to a rational ratio.
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Figure 10.2. Clavius’s construction of any number of specific points of a quadratrix.
72 M. PanzaIf the quadratrix is assumed to be obtained by tracing it as Pappus suggests, this solution
is open to Sporus’s objections [Pappus [CMH], I, 252–257]. They are two. The first makes a
statement of circularity: the constant speeds of the motions of OP and MN (Fig. 10.1)
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Figure 10.4. Solving the circle-squaring problem by relying on a quadratrix.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 73cannot be fixed if the circle of radius OC has not been rectified beforehand. The second
makes a statement of inaccuracy: the point G is not an intersection point, since OP and
MN do not intersect in their common final position OA.
As observed by Bos [Bos 2001, 42–43, footnote 15], the first objection can be overcome
by modifying Pappus’s definition. It is enough to identify a quadratrix as the trajectory of
the intersection point F of two straight half-lines OQ and MT that move uniformly with
any arbitrary speed in opposite directions from those in which the segments OP and MN
are assumed to move according to this definition: both starting from position OS, the
former rotating counterclockwise and the later going from bottom to top. The segment
OC thus does not have to be given beforehand, and point C is rather obtained as the
intersection point of such a quadratrix and the perpendicular to OS through O. Once this
point is obtained, the circle of radius OC can be squared by relying on this quadratrix,
and, once this circle is squared, any other circle can be so by constructing a fourth
proportional.
The second objection cannot be equally overcome, since it applies however a quadr-
atrix is obtained. Neither can it be overcome by appealing to Clavius’s previous argu-
ment, despite Clavius’s own allegation. It is not only obvious, indeed, that G is not one
of the points F1;1, F2;1, etc. It is also clear that if a quadratrix is obtained as Clavius
suggests, any other point of it that is not one of these points is in the same situation
as G. Hence, far from replying to Sporus’s latter objection, Clavius merely disregards
it, by frankly admitting that a curve can be obtained by interpolation, as is said in mod-
ern parlance.2.3.4. Six sorts of nonelementary constructions
The previous examples present six different sorts of nonelementary constructions.46
There are, first, two sorts of quasi-elementary constructions. The former are those that
appeal to instruments used in the pointing way. The latter are those that rely on some expli-
cit stipulations or tacit admissions working as constructive clauses, like Viète’s postulate, or
Clavius’s admission that the points K*, L*, and M* (Fig. 8.1) are ipso facto obtained.
There are then four sorts of strictly nonelementary constructions differing from each
other in the way the relevant curves are obtained. Some involve conics supposed to be ipso
facto obtained if univocally determined. Others involve curves traced by instruments used
in the tracing way, or at least described as trajectories of motions reproducible through46 My classification does not coincide with Bos’s [Bos 2001, 61] and is motivated by different
arguments and distinctions.
74 M. Panzaappropriate such instruments. Others again involve curves obtained through generic point-
wise constructions. Finally, some involve curves obtained by interpolation.3. Descartes’s exactness
EPG is often described as dealing with ideal and immutable self-standing objects or
forms, which we can only inaccurately depict.47 If EPG were so understood, the use of
instruments in geometry (both in the pointing and in the tracing way), and more gener-
ally the appeal to motion, should be considered as entirely extraneous to its spirit, unless
they were merely seen as tricks for achieving convenient depictions of ideal forms. The
situation is different if it is granted that EPG objects are obtained through diagrammatic
constructions. It then becomes natural to consider the admission of new procedures for
drawing diagrams, also by using instruments, as a proper way of conservatively extending
EPG.
In classical geometry, the use of instruments to obtain geometrical objects did not go
together with fixing precise conditions that such a use of an instrument had to submit
to. As a matter of fact, this made the exactness norms of geometric objects inaccurate
and contributed highly to the fluidity of classical geometry. More generally, this fluidity
depended on the fact that different sorts of nonelementary constructions were either admit-
ted or rejected by appealing to different sorts of arguments, or even without relying on any
precise argument.
Different opinions have been advanced on the evolution of Descartes’s views on geom-
etry: some insisting on the occurrence of essential changes, other on a substantial continuity
of thinking. I cannot discuss these opinions here. I merely advance that, at least on one
basic point, Descartes’s views did not change from his youth until the Géométrie. He always
aimed to overcome a situation like that just described, by imposing some global principles
motivating an all-embracing attitude concerning constructions. A detailed account of the
different ways in which he pursued this aim in different periods of his life is outside the
scope of the present paper. I shall limit myself to the Géométrie, by showing that these prin-
ciples, though based on a general standard of conceivability, remained faithful in spirit to
EPG restrictions.3.1. Descartes on the mean proportionals problem
A convenient way to approach the matter is by considering what Descartes says about
the mean proportionals problems at the beginning of the third book [Descartes 1637,
369–371; Descartes [AT], VI, 442–444; Bos 2001, 239–242]. As he famously refers to an
instrument introduced in the second book [Descartes 1637, 317–319; Descartes [AT], VI,
391–392], which I have already mentioned in Section 2.3.2, some remarks on this instrument
are necessary first. It is usually called ‘mesolabum’ or ‘proportions compass.’ I prefer the
latter name, since the former also sometimes denotes Eratosthenes’s instrument described
in this same section or others inspired by it [Bos 2001, 35–36, 48, 72].47 This account is often taken to be a Platonic one. Still, though inspired by Proclus’s neo-Platonic
interpretation of EPG [Proclus [CITF]; Proclus [CIPM]], it contrasts with some recent understand-
ings of Plato’s conception of geometry, such as Burnyeat’s [1987].
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Figure 11.1. Proportions compass.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 75Consider the instrument represented in Fig. 8.3. For further convenience, change the
names of points L, K and B and call them ‘L1,’ ‘K1’, and ‘L2,’ respectively (Fig. 11.1). Then
complete it by extending the pattern K0L1K1L2 beyond L2: attach to Li ði ¼ 2; 3; . . .Þ the rul-
ers LiKi perpendicular to AP, and to Ki the rulers Liþ1Ki perpendicular to AQ. Keep K0 fixed
on both AQ and L1K0, while the points Li ði ¼ 1; 2; . . .Þ slide on the rulers AP and LiKi1 and
remain fixed on the rulers LiKi, and the points Ki slide on the rulers AQ and LiKi and remain
fixed on the rulers Liþ1Ki. The triangles Ki1ALi and KiALi are similar to each other. Hence
AKi1 : ALi ¼ ALi : AKi ¼ AKi : ALiþ1. If AK0 ¼ a, it follows that: (i) if the compass is so
arranged that AKi ¼ b, then segments respectively equal to AL1;AK1;AL2; . . . ;AKi1;ALi
are 2i  1 mean proportionals between a and b; (ii) if the compass is so arranged that
ALiþ1 ¼ b, then segments respectively equal to AL1;AK1;AL2; . . . ;ALi;AKi are 2i mean pro-
portionals between a and b.
This makes it obvious how to use proportions compasses in the pointing way to solve
mean proportionals problems. Still, Descartes does not suggest using them this way. He
rather shows how to rely on the curves EKi traced by points Ki while AQ rotates around
A, for constructing any even number of mean proportionals. Let it be required to construct
2l mean proportionals between a and b (for some positive integer l, and supposing that
a < b). Descartes’s construction goes as follows. Let ae (Fig. 11.2) be equal to a. Produce
it up to l0 so that al0 ¼ b. Trace the circle with diameter al0, and apply to e the curve traced
by the point Kl of a proportions compass with AK0 ¼ a, in such a way that e coincides with
its origin marked by point E on the compass. Let k0 be the intersection point of this circle
and this curve. Join a and k0 and, with center a, trace the circle of radius ae cutting ak0 at k.
Trace lk perpendicular to ak0. Then, al and ak0 are respectively equal to the smallest and the
greatest of the 2l sought-after mean proportionals. If l > 1, the other 2l 2 can be con-
structed as fourth proportionals.
Though Descartes does not note it, an analogous construction allows the construction of
any odd number of mean proportionals. It goes as follows. Let it be required to find 2l 1
mean proportionals between two given segments a and b (for some integer l greater than 1,
and supposing that a < b). Assuming that ae and ag (Fig. 11.3) are two segments with a
common extremity that are respectively equal to a and b, one can proceed as follows
(regardless of the angledgae). Apply to e the curve traced by the point Kl of a proportions
ak
l l'
k'
e
g
Figure 11.3. Solving the 2l 1 mean proportionals problems by relying on a curve traced by a
proportions compass.
a
k
l
k'
e l'
Figure 11.2. Solving the 2l mean proportionals problems by relying on a curve traced by a
proportions compass.
76 M. Panzacompass with AK0 ¼ a, in such a way that e coincides with its origin. With center a, trace a
circle of radius ag cutting this curve at k0. Join a to k0 and, with center a, trace the circle of
radius ae cutting ak0 at k. Produce ae and trace lk and l0k0, respectively perpendicular to ak0
and al0. Then al and al0 are respectively equal to the smallest and the greatest of the 2l 1
sought-after mean proportionals. 2l 3 can be constructed as fourth proportionals.
One understands why, for Descartes, there is neither an “easier” way to solve the mean
proportionals problems nor a “more evident” proof that their solution is sound [Descartes
1637, 370; Descartes [AT], VI, 442–443]. But this is not all, since, despite this, he famously
adds that “it would be a mistake in geometry” to apply this solution for finding two, four,
or six mean proportionals, since, “for the construction of any problem [. . .][,] we should
choose with care the simplest [curve],” and these mean proportionals can be found through
curves of a “simpler genus” than those traced by proportions compasses [Descartes 1637,
369–371; Descartes [AT], VI, 442–444; Bos 2001, 357–359].48 Descartes is generalizing Pap-
pus’s simplicity precept here [Pappus [CMH], I, 270–273; Bos 2001, 48–50], and—by assum-
ing that any curve to be admitted in geometry is expressed by a two-variable polynomial
equation—he measures the simplicity of these curves through the degree of their equations.
Let us see how his precept applies to the present case.48 The translations of quotations from the Géométrie are mine, but are based either on Smith and
Latham’s translation [Descartes [GDSL]], or on Bos’s or others’ translations offered in the
secondary sources I refer to.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 77If referred to orthogonal lineal coordinates whose origin and axis coincide respectively
with the pole A and the ruler AP of a proportions compass with AK0 ¼ AE ¼ a, the curves
traced by the points Ki ði ¼ 1; 2; . . .Þ of this compass have equation x4i ¼ a2ðx2 þ y2Þ2i1.
The solution of the two mean proportionals problem provided by the former of the two
previous constructions relies then on a quadric, whereas Menaechmus’s solution (references
are given in Section 2.3.2) relies on two conics.
Something similar happens for the four and six mean proportionals problems. At the end
of the Géométrie [Descartes 1637, 411–412; Descartes [AT], VI, 483–484; Bos 2001, 368–
372], Descartes shows how to solve the former by relying on a circle and a cubic—the so
called Cartesian parabola, introduced in the second book [Descartes 1637, 309, 322, 337,
343; Descartes [AT], VI, 381–382, 395, 408–409, 415]—whereas the solution provided by
the first of the two previous constructions relies on a curve of degree 8. He does not show
how to solve the latter problem by relying on curves simpler than the curve of degree 12
involved in the first of the two previous constructions, but he seems to think that his solu-
tion of the former problem can be generalized.
This is quite a difficult matter. Fortunately, we do not need to enter into it, since two
things are immediately clear: (i) for any positive integer l, the 2l mean proportionals prob-
lem can be solved by relying on two curves of equations yxl ¼ al and alby ¼ xlþ1, respec-
tively; (ii) if h, p, and q are three positive integers such that h ¼ pq, the h 1 mean
proportionals problem can be reduced to the p 1 and q 1 mean proportionals ones.49
From (ii), it follows that, for any positive integer l, the 2l 1 mean proportionals prob-
lem can be reduced to the single mean proportional and the l 1 mean proportionals ones,
and then, by reiteration, either to the single mean proportional problem alone, or to the sin-
gle mean proportional and the 2m mean proportionals problems, for some positive integer m
such that 2m < 2l 1. Jointly with (i), this entails that, whatever the positive integer n
might be, solving the n mean proportionals problem by relying on a curve traced by a pro-
portions compass does not comply with Descartes’s simplicity precept.5049 This is easy to explain. Let a and b be the two given segments and suppose a < b. If x is the
smallest of p 1 mean proportionals between them, the smallest of q 1 mean proportionals
between a and x, is also the smallest of h 1 mean proportionals between a and b. The reason is
obvious: if the p 1 mean proportionals between a and b are x; y; . . . ;w ðx < y < . . . < wÞ, by
introducing q 1 mean proportionals between a and x, other q 1 ones between x and y; . . ., and
finally other q 1 ones between w and b, one gets ðq 1Þpþ p 1 ¼ pq 1 ¼ h 1 mean
proportionals between a and b.
50 The reason is evident. Suppose that n is even, that is, n ¼ 2l, for some positive integer l. Then, the
curve traced by a proportions compass that enters into the solution of the n mean proportionals
problem has equation x4l ¼ a2ðx2 þ y2Þ2l1 and is then a curve of degree 4l ¼ 2n. On the other
hand, from (i) it follows that this same problem can also be solved by appealing to two curves of
degree lþ 1 ¼ ðnþ 2Þ=2. Better, if nþ 1 is not prime, from (ii) it also follows that this problem can
be reduced to the p 1 and q 1 mean proportionals ones, where p and q are such that pq ¼ nþ 1.
Suppose, instead that n is odd, that is, n ¼ 2l 1, for some positive integer l. The curve traced by a
proportions compass that enters into the solution of the nmean proportionals problem has equation
x4l ¼ a2ðx2 þ y2Þ2l1 again, and is then a curve of degree 4l ¼ 2ðnþ 1Þ. On the other hand, from (ii)
it follows that this same problem can be reduced to the single mean proportional and the
l 1 ¼ ðn 1Þ=2 ones. If this last number is odd, the reduction can continues in the same way. If it
is even, then from (i) it follows that the problems can be solved by appealing to two curves of degree
ðnþ 3Þ=4.
78 M. PanzaTwo distinct criteria are then opposed to each other concerning the choice of the appro-
priate solution for the mean proportionals problems: one of easiness, another of simplicity.
The former prescribes solving these problems by relying on curves traced by proportions
compasses, which are easy to conceive and use; the latter prescribes relying on curves of
the lower possible degree, which (a few particular cases aside) are quite difficult to deter-
mine. According to Descartes, to choose the former solution is a “mistake.” But then,
why does he mention the proportions compass twice in the Géométrie? The answer is that
this mistake is one “in geometry”: by choosing the former solution, one makes a mistake,
but still appeals to constructions and curves that should be admitted in geometry. Hence,
the easiness of such a solution can be exploited both to illustrate the exactness norms rel-
ative to such curves,51 and to show that meeting these norms does not assure simplicity. The
former point is made in Book II, the latter in Book III. For my present purpose, only the
former is relevant.523.2. Ruler, compass, and reiteration
More precisely, Descartes makes this point immediately after the discussion of Pappus’s
classification of geometrical problems into “plane,” “solid,” and “linelike” ones, according
to whether their solution requires only straight lines (or segments) and circles, also requires
conics, or needs, as Descartes says, “more composed lines,” or, in Pappus’s parlance, “lines
having a varied and more convoluted origin” [Descartes 1637, 315–317; Descartes [AT], VI,
388–390; Pappus [CMH], I, 270–271; Bos 2001, 37–48]. During this discussion Descartes
remarks that among line-like problems there are some that can be solved by relying on
curves that share an essential feature with straight lines, circles and conics. Hence, the
appropriate classification is not Pappus’s, but a more complex one concerned with curves,
rather than with problems: one should first distinguish those curves that share this feature
from those that do not, and then classify the former. Whereas geometricity requires using
only the former, simplicity requires using, among them, those of the lower genus. Descartes
also criticizes the “ancients” for having termed ‘mechanical’ any curves other than circles
and conics. He argues that this denomination cannot be justified by advancing that “some
sort of mechanical instruments [machines] has to be used to describe them,” since circles and
straight lines also “cannot be described on paper without the use of a compass and a ruler,
which may also be termed ‘mechanical instruments’” [Descartes 1637, 315; Descartes [AT],
VI, 388].
Insofar as Descartes seems to take for granted that rulers and compasses have to be used
in accordance with the clauses of elementary constructions, his point seems to be that
obtaining circles and straight lines (or better, segments) requires elementary constructions.
This is obviously not the same as arguing that elementary constructions are enough for
constructing all circles and straight lines (or segments) that have to be constructed in order
to solve a geometrical problem. Still, Descartes seems to imply that the very last step in the
construction of circles and straight lines (or segments) has to depend on the application of51 For Serfati [1993, 219–220], the curves traced by proportions compasses are “exemplars” of those
that Descartes admits in geometry.
52 Among the large literature concerning the latter point, let me point out the recent contribution of
Lützen [2010].
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 79one of the constructive clauses of elementary constructions.53 Hence, it is only by admitting
the possibility of obtaining some non-EPG objects, namely some curves other than circles,
that one can go, for him, beyond the limits of these constructions. This is the same as deny-
ing the rightfulness of quasi-elementary constructions. Descartes seems thus to consider
that these constructions have either to be recast under the form of strictly nonelementary
ones, or ipso facto discarded.54
His insistence on instruments used in the tracing way is not enough, however, to discard
strictly nonelementary constructions that do not appeal to instruments, since the curves
involved in these constructions could be also traceable through appropriate instruments.
Hence, according to Descartes, the search for new exactness norms to be added to those
of EPG results in a double purpose: to identify an appropriate class of instruments to be
used in the tracing way for obtaining curves other than circles; to establish whether some
curves obtained in some other ways could also be traced by these instruments. This double
purpose results, in turn, from a double reduction: the question of fixing the nonelementary
constructions to be admitted in geometry is first reduced to the question of identifying the
curves other than circles that are to be admitted in geometry; this question is then reduced
to that of identifying a class of instruments that, when used in the tracing way, trace curves
that are admitted in geometry just because they can be so traced. Descartes famously terms
these curves ‘geometrical’ [Descartes 1637, 319; Descartes [AT], VI, 392].55 For short, let us
also call ‘geometrical linkages’ the instruments to be used to trace these same curves (argu-
ments justifying this denomination will be offered later).53 An example can be useful to better explain my understanding of Descartes’s claim. Compare
Viète’s and Pappus solution of the angle trisection problem (both related in Section 2.3.1). They both
involve a nonelementary construction. But the reasons the constructions involved in these solutions
are nonelementary are essentially different from each other. The construction involved in the former
is nonelementary because it includes the construction of a segment (the segment FE: Fig. 1) under the
supposition that some EPG objects are given (the circle of center B and radius BE, the point E on it,
and the segment BD), these objects being such that no constructive clause of elementary
constructions licenses constructing this segment under the supposition that they are given. The
construction involved in the latter is nonelementary because it includes the construction of an
hyperbola, which is not an EPG object (cf. footnote 39, above). Once this hyperbola is constructed,
its intersection point D with the relevant circle (Fig. 3) is ipso facto constructed, as occurs in
elementary constructions for the intersection points of segments and circles. And, once this point is
given, the construction continues as an elementary one. Namely, the segments AD and EF, on which
the trisection depends, are constructed according to the constructive clauses of elementary
constructions. Hence, whereas Viète’s construction includes a step in which a segment is constructed
according to a constructive clause which is not included among those of elementary constructions,
the very last step in the construction of any segment and circle involved in Pappus’s construction
depends on the application of one of the constructive clauses of elementary constructions.
According to my understanding, Descartes’s point is that constructions such as the former are not
admissible.
54 I shall come back to the possible reasons for this exclusion in Section 3.3.
55 This second reduction produces an asymmetry first remarked by Mancosu [Mancosu 2007,
114–121, esp. 117; Mancosu 1996, 71–79] and discussed in Mancosu and Arana [2010]: to show how
to trace a curve through a geometrical linkage is enough to establish that it is geometrical, but
ignorance regarding the possibility of tracing a curve through such a linkage is not enough to
establish that it is not so.
80 M. PanzaHere is how Descartes characterizes these instruments [Descartes 1637, 316–317; Des-
cartes [AT], VI, 389–390]56:56 Be
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indep[. . .] mais il est, ce me semble, tres clair que, prenant, comme on fait, pour Geometrique ce
qui est precis et exact, et pour Mechanique ce qui ne l’est pas; et considérant la Geomet-
rie comme une science qui enseigne generalement a connoistre les mesures de tous les
cors; on n’en doit pas plutost exclure les lignes les plus composées que les plus simples,
pourvû qu’on les puisse imaginer estre descrites par un mouvement continu, ou par plu-
sieurs qui s’entresuivent et dont les derniers soient entierement reglés par ceux qui les
precedent: car, par ce moyen, on peut toujours avoir une connaissance exacte de leur
mesure. [. . .] la Spirale, la Quadratrice, et semblables [. . .] n’appartiennent veritablement
qu’aux Mecaniques et ne sont point du nombre de celles que je pense devoir icy estre
receues, a cause qu’on les imagine descrites par deux mouvements separés et qui n’ont
entre eux aucun rapport qu’on puisse mesurer exactement [. . .].Descartes’s discussion of proportions compasses in Book II is intended to illustrate this
passage. Hence, it is not only natural to wonder how this characterization should be under-
stood, but also why this compass illustrates it.57
All the responses offered to these questions agree on a fundamental statement that I also
share: Descartes requires that geometrical linkages be such that the motions of all their
parts depend on a unique principal motion which determines any other motion, including
those of the tracing points.58
This condition is clearly illustrated by proportions compasses (whose principal motion is
the rotation of ruler AQ). But these compasses also meet other conditions. One of them iscause of the relevance of this passage, I prefer to quote it in the original French; slightly
ent translations are offered in Descartes [[GDSL], 43–44; Bos 2001, 338 and 341; Mancosu
71–72].
e interplay between general standards of rational conceivability and intrinsically geometrical
rements (including faithfulness to the spirit of EPG) that is typical to Descartes’s geometry is
nt in his characterization of geometrical linkages and curves. Characterizing geometrical linkages
tainly not enough to explain whyDescartes considers curves traced by them to be admissible in an
t” science such as (pure) geometry, that is, why he considers them to be exactly conceivable: this is
stion about Descartes’s epistemology that cannot be settled by considering only his geometry.
n the other hand, no account of his general notion of rational conceivability can be enough to
rstand his characterization of geometrical linkages and curves. Two examples are enough to
in why. Domski [2009, 123] emphasizes the role played inDescartes’s geometry by “a standard of
igibility grounded on simple and clearly conceivable motions,” and suggests that geometrical
s are those that can be obtained through an “intelligible motion.”Arana [forthcoming] suggests,
d, that for Descartes “constructed objects are known best when the construction is carried out in
that is fully present to the attentive constructing mind.” Both suggestions have value. But they
entirely open the problem of understanding whatmakes, forDescartes, somemotions simple and
y conceivable in geometry, or some geometrical constructions fully present to the attentive mind.
pcoming discussion could be taken as a tentative clarification of these matters.
similar point in made in a famous letter to Beeckman of 16 March 1619, where Descartes
s that the curves described by his instruments “result from one single motion,” whereas other
s such as the quadratrix are “generated by different motions not subordinate to one other”
artes [AT], X, 157; Bos 2001, 231]. Using the terminology of modern mathematical analysis,
ould say that in the former case, the relevant single motion is the independent motion among
that the different parts of the instrument are submitted to, in the same sense in which x is the
endent variable relative to a function y ¼ f ðxÞ.
Figure 12. Huygens’s instrument for tracing spirals.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 81that, if they move, each of their motions can only follow a unique and perfectly determinate
trajectory, to the effect that the speed and direction of these motions have no influence on
the curves they trace (since these curves are just the trajectories that the motions of some
points taken on the compasses are constrained to follow, if these compasses move).59
Descartes does not mention this condition—probably because he (wrongly) takes it to be
entailed by the previous one—but he clearly requires that all geometrical linkages meet it. It
follows that the curves traced by each of the tracing points of a geometrical linkage are, by
definition, univocally determined regardless of the way this same linkage is set in motion.
This is also the case for straight lines and circles, if they are taken to be traced by rulers
and compasses (respectively conceived as fixed bars on which a tracing point moves, and
as rotating bars on which a tracing point is fixed). I suggest that this is the essential feature
that, according to Descartes, geometrical curves share with straight lines and circles: they
have to be traceable by instruments so conceived that, if they move, their tracing points
are constrained to follow some determinate trajectories that are independent of their actual
motion (that is, both of the fact that they actually move, and of the direction and speed with
which they possibly do), to the effect that this is also the case of the curves they trace, which
are nothing but these same trajectories.60 Geometrical linkages have then to be instruments
such as these, i.e., mere tools capable of fixing such trajectories.
But, though necessary, this and the previous condition stated in Descartes’s quote are
still not sufficient to characterize geometrical linkages. To understand why, consider the
instrument for tracing spirals that Huygens sketched in his notebook in 1650, possibly after
having heard about it from Descartes himself [Bos 2001, 345, 347–349; Mancousu and
Arana 2010, Sect. 3; Huygens’s sketch is reproduced in Fig. 12, which is taken from Bos
2001, 348]. A ruler AF is left free to rotate around a fixed pole B, in which a fixed disk C
is centered; a string is attached to the disk at the top extremity E of it, goes up to the moving
extremity A of the ruler, and then comes back along the ruler itself up to a tracing pin D
that is left free to slide on this ruler. Initially, the ruler stands horizontally on the left of
the disk and the tracing pin is placed in the pole. While it rotates counterclockwise, the
string winds up around the disk and pulls the tracing pin, so that it traces an arc of spiral.
This instrument meets the condition for geometrical instruments explicitly stated in Des-
cartes’s passage quoted above. Its principal motion is the rotation of the ruler AF, and it is
then constrained to follow a determinate trajectory, indicated for example by the circle59 Proportions compasses seem, however, to have an initial position from which the rotating ruler
can only move in one direction. I shall come back to this matter later.
60 Serfati [1993, 227–228] has similarly argued that in the “generation” of curves through
geometrical linkages only “the automatism” of such an instrument is at issue, whereas the generation
of spirals and quadratrices require “a thinking subject that, at any instant, brings together two
movements [. . .] in her/his hand.”
82 M. Panzadescribed by the pointA during this rotation.Moreover, the speed of thismotion has no influ-
ence on the trajectory followed by the tracing pin D, which is the curve traced by this instru-
ment. Still, this trajectory, and thus this curve, are not independent of the directionwithwhich
the principal motion describes its trajectory, since, for the pin D to move, the ruler AF has to
turn counterclockwise. But suppose that the string is replaced by a wire so conceived that the
tracing pin D also moves if the ruler AF rotates clockwise by going either forward or back-
ward along this ruler according whether this same ruler rotates counterclockwise or clock-
wise. The new instrument that is so gotten is such that the trajectory followed by the
tracing pin D, and then the curve it traces, are independent of its actual motion.
Still, Descartes would have not considered it as a geometrical linkage: it is likely that he
knew Huygens’s original instrument and nevertheless considered the spiral not to be a geo-
metrical curve; and it is also likely that he would have not changed his mind if he had imag-
ined the previous modification.
Though Descartes never mentions Huygens’s instrument, he considers instruments
involving strings, and he argues that the curves they trace should be taken to be geometrical
if strings are used “to determine the equality or difference of two or more straight lines
which can be drawn from each point of the sought-after curve to certain other points or
toward other lines at certain angles.” He also adds that “one cannot accept [in geometry]
any lines which are like strings, that is to say which become sometimes straight and some-
times curved” [Descartes 1637, 340; Descartes [AT], VI, 412; Bos 2001, 347; Mancosu 2007,
118].
The string involved in Huygens’s instrument is not used as required in the former of
these passages, and rather behaves as is said in the latter. Many scholars have then argued
that Descartes does not consider this or similar instruments to be geometrical linkages just
for this reason. For Descartes, curves that “become sometimes straight and sometimes
curved” are not geometrical because “the proportion between straight lines and curves
[. . .][is] not known, and [. . .][will never] be so to man” [Descartes 1637, 340; Descartes
[AT], VI, 412; Bos 2001, 347; Mancosu 2007, 118]. Hence, these scholars argue that Des-
cartes’s motivation for discarding these instruments depends on his agreement with this
old Aristotelian dogma: he would admit that segments and arcs of curves are incommen-
surable magnitudes or, at least, magnitudes that stay to each other in an exactly unknow-
able proportion, and he would then discard these instruments, alleging that the proportion
between the straight and curved parts of their strings is exactly unknowable. This is Bos’s
view. Moreover, Bos thinks that Descartes’s “separation between geometrical and non-geo-
metrical curves [. . .] rested ultimately on his conviction that proportions between curves
and straight lengths cannot be known exactly” [Bos 2001, 342, 349].
This view is problematic. Mancosu [2004, 119; cf. also Mancosu 1996, 77] has challenged
it by observing that “the algebraic rectification of certain algebraic curves in the 1650s did
not undermine the foundations of Descartes’s Geometry.” More specifically, one could also
remark that there is no need for the proportion of the straight and curved parts of the string
entering into Huygens’s instrument to be known in order for this instrument to work. It is
only necessary to know this proportion in order to characterize the curve that is traced
independently of the instrument itself. But to require that geometrical linkages trace curves
that could be characterized independently of them would be the same as inverting the def-
initional order between geometrical linkages and curves, characterizing the former on the
basis of the latter, rather than vice versa. Hence, either Descartes’s characterization of geo-
metrical curves does not rest, in fact, on his characterization of geometrical linkages, or the
previous reason for discarding instruments such as Huygens’s is not sound.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 83I take the latter to be true, and suggest that the reason that Descartes discards these
instruments is another one. To understand it, consider proportions compasses again.
Conceived as material devices, they cannot but be composed of a finite number of finite rul-
ers. Still, they can also be conceived as abstract systems, i.e., as appropriate configurations
of an infinite number of straight lines that move by meeting some incidence conditions and
without any force being exerted. And, if they are so conceived, AQ can move indefinitely on
both sides of AP so that points Ki ði ¼ 1; 2; . . .Þ trace infinitely many curves infinitely
extended. The previous discussion of Huygens’s instrument and of its modified version
should make clear, instead, that they cannot be so conceived, because their mechanical
nature is essential for them to work. Not only does their working depend on the physical
properties of their strings or wires, and not only must their ruler AF have an extremity
or some sort of hub around which such a string or wire passes, but they are also so designed
to work only insofar as some forces are exerted by and upon their components. Moreover,
there is no room to suppose that their motion is indefinitely continued so as to trace an
entire spiral.
There is thus an essential difference between instruments such as Huygens’s and propor-
tions compasses: the latter can be conceived as purely geometrical systems that are taken to
move and to trace entire curves because of their motion; the former are intrinsically
mechanical devices that cannot but trace finite arcs of curves. I suggest that, for Descartes,
geometrical linkages are instruments like the latter and not like the former: they are—or at
least they can be conceived as—moving configurations of geometrical objects.
It is enough to admit that the term ‘line’ refers to geometrical objects (which is quite nat-
ural) to recognize this idea rather explicitly expressed in something Descartes writes before
mentioning the proportions compasses for the first time [Descartes 1637, 316; Descartes
[AT], VI, 389; Bos 2001, 338]: “nothing else needs to be supposed to trace all the curves that
I purport to introduce here than that two or several lines can be moved one by the other
and that their intersection mark some other ones [. . .].” In the diagrams included in the
Géométrie, rulers entering into geometrical linkages are represented by double strokes,
which evokes their thickness. Still, this passage seems to say that they are—or at least
can be conceived as—nothing but straight lines or segments.
Another piece of textual evidence supporting my suggestion is offered by what Descartes
writes a little later, concerning the way the ancients used the term ‘mechanical curves’ [Des-
cartes 1637, 315–316; Descartes [AT], VI, 389]. He argues that this use cannot be justified by
observing that the curves the ancients termed ‘mechanical’ are traced by instruments that
are too “complicated [composé]” to be “right [iustes].” He then adds that this should rather
suggest rejecting these curves from mechanics, since it is there that “the rightness of the
works made with hands is desired,” whereas in geometry “only the rightness of reasoning
is pursued,” and rightness of reasoning can be as “perfect” about the curves traced by such
instruments as it is about straight lines, circles, and conics. This suggests that, for Descartes,
the relevant properties of the instruments tracing geometrical curves and of these same
curves do not depend on the material features of these instruments, but rather on the
way they are conceived by “reasoning.”
If this double textual evidence is taken to be weak, consider that it is a matter of fact that
Descartes rules out instruments including strings working as in Huygens’s and that the rea-
son usually invoked to justify this exclusion is both implausible and unsound, whereas the
reason I suggest does not seem to be so.
This reason agrees, moreover, with Descartes’s admission that some instruments, includ-
ing strings, can trace geometrical curves. Descartes’s point is, indeed, just this, and not that
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Figure 13. Instruments for tracing ellipses and hyperbolae.
84 M. Panzathese instruments are geometrical linkages. As examples, he mentions the instruments
evoked in the Dioptrique “in order to explain the ellipse and the hyperbola” [Descartes
1637, 340; Descartes [AT], VI, 412]. These are the instruments entering into the gardener’s
constructions of these curves. Descartes terms them “very coarse and not very exact,” but
still maintains that they are such as “to make [. . .] the nature [of these curves] better
known” [Descartes 1637, 89–90, 100–101; Descartes [AT], VI, 166, 176]. This suggests that
Descartes takes these constructions to be capable of fixing the nature of these curves, but
still not to be admissible in geometry, as such. I explain this as follows: these constructions
rely on intrinsically mechanical devices but suggest two instruments involving no string,
which also trace these curves and meet all the previous conditions for being geometrical
linkages. These are two anti-parallelograms ABECD (Fig. 13) whose side AB is fixed, while
sides AC and BD rotate together around A and B, being linked by side DC, so that these
curves are traced by their intersection point E. Descartes’s claim seems thus to be that some
curves traced by instruments including strings are geometrical not because these instru-
ments are themselves geometrical linkages, but because they suggest geometrical linkages
tracing these curves.61
To admit that geometrical linkages are—or can be conceived as—moving configurations
of geometrical objects is of course not enough to characterize them. And, I argue that it is
neither enough to add, according to what has been said above, that (a) the motions of all
their parts depend on a unique principal motion; (b) they include one or more tracing
points, and, if they move, these tracing points are constrained to follow some determinate
trajectories which are independent of their actual motion, to the effect that this is also the
case of the curves they trace, which are nothing but these same trajectories. What makes a
moving configuration meeting these conditions a geometrical linkage (i.e., an instrument
that traces a geometrical curve in Descartes’s sense) is, I hold, that it can be obtained61 A similar point is made by Molland [1976, 42].
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Figure 14. Trisecting compass.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 85through a licensed construction.62 More precisely, I argue that such a moving configuration
is a geometrical linkage if and only if it can be constructed in an arbitrary position through
a licensed construction. This condition needs clarification.
A first point to be clarified is concerned with the requirement that such a moving con-
figuration be constructed in an arbitrary position. This means that what has to be con-
structed is the fixed configuration of geometrical objects that constitutes the position it
takes when an arbitrary respective position of the objects directly involved in its principal
motion is chosen, in such a way that these objects do not coincide with each other, and its
invariant components are allowed to meet the conditions they are possibly required to meet.
The construction has thus to begin from these objects taken in such an arbitrary position.
Consider two examples.
The first is provided by the proportions compass. The objects directly involved in its
principal motion are the rulers AP and AQ (Fig. 11.1). Whatever their respective positions
might be, the invariant distance AK0 can be determined as required. Hence, the construction
of such a compass can start by choosing any arbitrary respective position of these rulers,
provided they do not coincide.
The second example is less simple. It concerns the “compass” Descartes describes in the
Cogitationes Privat (together with the proportions one) by suggesting using it to solve the
angle trisection problem [Descartes [AT], X, 213–256, esp. 234–240; Serfati 1993, 205–212;
Bos 2001, 237–245].63 Call it ‘trisection compass.’ It includes four rulers AB, AC, AD, AE
(Fig. 14) the first three of which are rotating around a common pole A, and the fourth62 It is quite usual to argue that Descartes’s linkages are “idealized instruments” to be “imagined”
[cf. Molland 1976, 42]. My point is quite different. I hold them to be geometrical objects requiring
(diagrammatic) construction, rather than mere imagination.
63 The Cogitationes Privat date back to 1619. The same compass is also mentioned in the letter to
Beeckman of March 26th of the same year [Descartes [AT], X, 154–160, esp. 154–156] as being part
of a family of compasses, each of which is to be used to solve the n-section problem for a certain
positive integer n.
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Figure 15. Villalpando’s compass modified.
86 M. Panzaof which is fixed. On them, the points F, I, K, L are taken at equal distance from A, and at
these points four other rulers, all equal to AL, are respectively attached so that those
attached to F and K are also attached to the same point G sliding on AC, those attached
to I and L are also attached to the same point H sliding on AD. If AL is such that AC is able
to come full circle around A starting from being coincident with AE, while AC so turns, G
traces the curve MGPAQR.64 This compass is certainly a geometrical linkage. Still, if one
wanted to construct it starting by choosing an arbitrary respective position of rulers AE
and AB, its construction would require either already having solved the angle trisection
problem, or using the rulers composing this compass as physical devices that exert appro-
priate forces upon each other. If one starts, instead, by choosing an arbitrary respective
position of rulers AE and AD and fixing L on the former so that AL is long enough, the com-
pass can be constructed through an easy elementary construction. It is thus constructible in
a licensed way only if its principal motion is taken to be the rotation of AD.
A second point to be clarified concerns the curves that the construction of geometrical
linkages relies on, possibly. Return for this purpose to Villalpando’s compass (Fig. 9.2),
which is also, certainly, a geometrical linkage. But suppose that, instead of tracing Villal-
pando’s locus through it, one wanted to trace this locus through another instrument so con-
ceived that the tracing point F (Fig. 15) is at the intersection of two rotating rulers OX and
EZ. This instrument should be such that OD = OE = EF. To ensure this, one could imagine
equipping the instrument with two equal circles, respectively centered in E and O, and
requiring that points D and F slide on them. But, as OD varies, the radii of these circles
should also vary. If the instrument were conceived as a material device, it would thus be
very hard to build, and it should in any case be made of some appropriate deformable stuff.
If it were conceived as a moving configuration of geometrical objects all of whose motions
depend on a principal one, it should include some system of lines used to transform the
rotation of OX or EZ into the increasing of the radii of these circles. Villalpando’s compass
(Fig. 9.2) works in a much simpler way, since it transmits its principal motion (the rotation
of IM or JM) into the motion of F without relying on any circle. This shows that there is no
need to appeal to changing circles in order to assure that, while a linkage moves, some seg-
ments included in it remain equal, though varying in length. One can rather use appropriate64 This is a sextic curve with equation 4a4x2 ¼ ðx2 þ y2Þðx2 þ y2  2a2Þ2, with respect to orthogonal
coordinates of origin A and axis AE, with a ¼ AL [Bos 2001, 238, footnote 20]. The trisecting
compass stands to the angle trisection problem in the same relation as the proportions compass
stands to the mean proportionals problems: it can be used to solve the former problem both in the
pointing and in the tracing way, but this problem can also be solved (as said in Section 2.3.1) by
relying on simpler curves, namely on circles and conics.
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Figure 16.1. Turning ruler with a moving circle.
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 87configurations of rotating segments or straight lines meeting some conditions of
orthogonality.
But there are other purposes for which circles can enter into geometrical linkages. An
example is gotten if Villalpando’s compass is transformed by replacing the ruler IM
(Fig. 9.2) with a circle of diameter IJ on which M is required to slide. This transformation
has no influence on the curve which is traced. The new instrument is thus a geometrical
linkage including a fixed circle. Hence, the inverse transformation shows that fixed circles
can enter into geometrical linkages in such a way that they can be replaced by rulers with-
out influence on the curve which is traced. But there are also cases of geometrical linkages
including circles that cannot be replaced by other components without influence on the
curve which is traced. An example including a circle moving rigidly is provided by
Descartes himself [Descartes 1637, 322; Descartes [AT], VI, 395]: a ruler GL (Fig. 16.1)
rotates around a fixed pole G while the point L slides on it in such a way as to stay at
its intersection with another fixed ruler AB; to L is attached another ruler LK that slides
with this point on AB; to K is attached a circle KCM; the intersection point C of this circle
and the ruler GL traces a curve PCQ which is a conchoid of a straight line.
Descartes comes to this example by modifying a simpler instrument including, instead of
the circle KCM, a straight line KC (Fig. 16.2) forming a fixed acute angle with LK, and claims
that an infinity of similar linkages can be reached from this basic one by replacing this
straight line with any geometrical curve [Descartes 1637, 319–323; Descartes [AT], VI,
392–395; Serfati 1993, 220–221; Serfati 2002; Bos 2001, 278–281]. Following Bos, call these
linkages ‘turning rulers with a moving curve.’ The basic one traces a hyperbola; Descartes
first suggests replacing the straight line KC with this same hyperbola, then continues by sug-
gesting replacing it either with a circle (as said) or with a parabola, and finally observes that
if the linkage includes a geometrical curve of the ith genus (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .), it traces a geomet-
rical curve of the ði þ 1Þth genus.
This is wrong [Serfati 2002], but shows that Descartes admits that geometrical linkages
can include circles or any other sort of geometrical curves moving rigidly. More generally,
I advance that geometrical linkages can include circles or any other sort of geometrical
curves if and only if these are fixed or move rigidly.
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Figure 16.2. Turning ruler with a moving straight line.
88 M. PanzaAll this finally suggests a necessary and sufficient characterization of geometrical link-
ages. They are moving configurations of geometrical objects that meet the conditions (a)
and (b) stated above, possibly include, besides straight lines (or segments), also circles
and geometrical curves which are fixed or move rigidly, and can be obtained, together with
the geometrical curves they trace, according to the following recursive procedure.
Term ‘elementary’ the geometrical linkages that can be constructed in an arbitrary position
through an elementary construction. Say that the curves traced by them are obtained by a
construction of type C½0. Examples of elementary linkages are usual compasses, as well as
conchoid, proportions, trisection, and Villalpando’s compasses, and turning rulers with a
moving curve where the moving curve is either a straight line or a circle.
The curves obtained by a construction of type C½0 can enter into new nonelementary geo-
metrical linkages. These can be constructed in an arbitrary position through a nonele-
mentary construction including the construction of these curves. This last construction
requires that appropriate elementary geometrical linkages be constructed starting from
appropriate given objects in such a position that they trace these curves in an appropriate
position. Say that the curves traced by such new geometrical linkages are obtained by a
construction of type C½1. An example is provided by the already mentioned Cartesian
parabola. This is traced by a turning ruler with a moving curve where the moving curve
is a usual parabola of axis AB. The construction of this last parabola requires that an
elementary linkage tracing it be constructed so as to trace this curve in such a position
that its axis coincides with AB and its vertex with K.
The procedure can continue indefinitely in the same way: the curves obtained by a con-
struction of type C½1 can enter into further geometrical linkages tracing curves that are
then obtained by a construction of type C½2, etc.
If these clauses are combined with those of elementary construction—by admitting, for
example, that a point can be constructed by intersection of a geometrical curve and a given
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 89segment or circle—one gets a new sort of diagrammatic nonelementary construction.65 I
suggest terming constructions obtained in this way ‘constructions by ruler, compass, and
reiteration.’ They allow one to obtain two essentially distinct sorts of objects which popu-
late Descartes’s geometry: the former are fixed objects, i.e., EPG objects and geometrical
curves; the latter are moving objects, i.e., geometrical linkages. The former can interact with
each other both in theorem-proving and in problem-solving. The latter are not supposed to
interact with each other, and a single geometrical linkage interacts with some fixed objects
only if it includes them, is constructed starting from them, or traces one of them.
Both fixed objects and geometrical linkages can be unconditional or conditional. Descartes
is not explicit about the conditions under which they are available within his geometry. Still, it
seems natural to admit that: (i) unconditional geometrical linkages and curves are available
withinDescartes’s geometry by definition (since they are geometrical linkages and curves just
insofar as they can be constructed by ruler, compass and reiteration, which is what makes
them available within Descartes’s geometry); (ii) unconditional EPG objects, conditional
geometrical linkages, and conditional fixed objects are available within Descartes’s geometry
if they can be constructed by ruler, compass, and reiteration, possibly starting from the given
objects that the conditions involved in the corresponding concepts are concerned with. These
are, I hold, the exactness norms that Descartes’s geometry is based on.3.3. Descartes on nonelementary constructions
We can now explain Descartes’s attitude with respect to the six sorts of nonelementary
constructions distinguished in Section 2.3.4.
A first point is clear: a construction involving curves described as trajectories of motions
is licensed for him if and only if it is a construction by ruler, compass, and reiteration, or
can be recast under the form of such a construction.
Concerning quasi-elementary constructions, I have already said that he rejects them from
the very beginning. But it still remains to understand why.
For those relying on explicit stipulations or tacit admissions working as constructive
clauses, the more plausible reason seems that he considers them as merely unjustified, inso-
far as they are based on ad hoc assumptions. Hence, either they can be appropriately recast,
or they have to be discarded.
For those relying on instruments used in the pointingway, the situation ismore delicate. As
amatter of fact, Descartes admits geometrical curves by force of their being traceable through
geometrical linkages. But then—one could plausibly wonder—why does he not also admit
constructions appealing to other, similar, instruments, so conceived as to be used in the point-
ing way? Of course, to substantiate this question, one should explain the nature of these
instruments, or, at least, the sense in which they might be considered as similar to geometrical
linkages. Presumably, one could take these instruments to be, like geometrical linkages, noth-
ing but moving configurations of geometrical objects, or at least to be such that one could65 The diagrammatic nature of these constructions is made manifest by the example of the
nonelementary linkage generating the Cartesian parabola just described. It is clear, indeed, that the
combination of the motion of the elementary linkage that traces the ordinary parabola that enters
into this nonelementary linkage with the motion of this last linkage does not make such a parabola
move rigidly, as it is assumed to do within this same linkage. Hence the motion of this ordinary
parabola is not merely produced by the combination of the motions of the two linkages and can only
be conceived, in fact, as the motion of the diagram that represents it.
90 M. Panzaconceive them as moving configurations of geometrical objects. But then, a possible reason
for Descartes to reject constructions appealing to such instruments could be the following:
in order to use moving configurations of geometrical objects in the pointing way one has
to assign to the diagrams representing these objects a role quite different from the role played
by diagrams both in elementary constructions and in constructions by ruler, compass, and
reiteration. The conditions under which moving configurations of geometrical objects used
in the pointing way would allow one to obtain the objects required could indeed not be
imposed on these diagrams, but should rather be acknowledged by inspecting them.
A simple example is provided by Eratosthenes’s solution to the two mean proportionals
problem considered in Section 2.3.2. As I have noted in this section, one could imagine
replacing the plates involved in this solution with genuine geometrical rectangles. But, as
I also noted, this would make no relevant difference, since it would require using the dia-
grams representing these rectangles in such a way that the relevant conditions that these
rectangles are supposed to meet are acknowledged by inspecting these diagrams rather than
imposed on them.
The point here is that, even if this acknowledgment were conceived as a purely ideal pro-
cedure, it would remain essentially different from any procedure entering elementary con-
structions or constructions by ruler, compass and reiteration. Hence, supposing that
Descartes’s reason for rejecting quasi-EPG constructions appealing to instruments used
in the pointing way was the previous one, his rejection of these constructions would depend
on his purpose of staying as close as possible to Euclid’s setting, and then excluding con-
structions structurally too different from EPG ones.
Consider now Descartes’s attitude with respect to strictly nonelementary constructions.
Those involving univocally determined conics are of course admitted by Descartes, since
they can be easily recast under the form of constructions by ruler, compass, and reiteration.
Something similar holds for generic pointwise constructions. These involve loci of points
which are generated by other points or straight lines. Consider such a locus and suppose
that it is the locus of a point that can be constructed, in an arbitrary position, by ruler, com-
pass and reiteration, and it is generated by another point, so constructed in turn. It is then
likely that the construction of these two points suggests a way for constructing a geomet-
rical linkage to be used to trace this locus. The case of Villalpando’s locus and compass pro-
vides an example. Descartes seems to think of a situation like this when he alleges to have
“furnished a way to describe” a curve, by “having explained the way of finding an infinite
number of points though which” it passes, and adds that “this way of finding a curve by
finding several of its points at random applies only to those curves which can also be
described by a regular and continuous motion” [Descartes 1637, 339–340; Descartes
[AT], VI, 411–412; Bos 2001, 344–345; Domski 2009, 125–129]. One could then conclude
that generic pointwise constructions of a curve are admitted by Descartes if and only if
the curve is also traceable by a geometrical linkage suggested by the very construction.
The situation is different for strictly nonelementary constructions involving curves
obtained by interpolation: however the points on which the interpolation is based are con-
structed, their construction provides no suggestion for constructing a geometrical linkage to
be used to trace these curves. Hence, these constructions have to be rejected (if they cannot
be appropriately recast). On this matter also, Descartes is explicit enough. In the Géométrie,
he remarks that in these constructions “one does not find indifferently all points of the
sought-after curve,” so that, “strictly speaking, one does not find a [generic] point of it, that
is, not one of those that which are so peculiarly points of it that they cannot be found
except by means of it” [Descartes 1637, 340; Descartes [AT], VI, 411; Bos 2001, 344]. Even
Rethinking Geometrical Exactness 91more clearly, in writing to Mersenne on November 13th 1629, he argues that “although one
could find an infinity of points through which the helix or the quadratrix must pass, one
cannot find geometrically any one of those points which are necessary for the desired
effect,” so that these curves “cannot be traced completely except by the intersection of
two movements” [Descartes [AT], I, 71; Mancosu and Arana 2010, footnote 10 and the rel-
evant quotation].
4. Concluding remarks: Descartes’s geometry and EPG
Whereas the exactness norms stated at the end of Section 3.2 fix the bounds of Des-
cartes’s geometrical ontology, the attitudes just described fix the constraints imposed by
this ontology on the most common sorts of constructions in classical geometry. This is
the same as fixing the bounds that have to be respected in solving geometrical problems.
But it is much less than fixing a general method for solving geometrical problems, prescrib-
ing the appropriate way to solve each problem: such a method has to conform to these
bounds, but these bounds are not enough to set it. Here is where simplicity and algebra
come into account, thanks to the assumption that geometrical curves are just those that
can be expressed, with respect to an appropriate system of lineal coordinates, by two-var-
iable polynomial equations.
This assumption also suggests a way to restate the bound of Descartes’s geometrical
ontology in a more convenient way, which, as a matter of fact, has been historically prom-
inent after Descartes. This leads to the problem of the relations between constructions by
rulers, compass, and reiteration and Descartes’s algebra. This problem has been differently
stated and tackled many times, and I cannot enter into it. My present enquiry can suggest,
at most, a way to formulate it anew.
Typically, unconditional geometrical linkages are defined by Descartes by describing
how to construct them. Their definition comes thus together with the proof that these link-
ages are available within this geometry. Hence, if unconditional geometrical curves of a cer-
tain sort are defined as the curves traced by a certain sort of unconditional geometrical
linkages so defined, the definition of these curves also goes together with the proof that they
are available within this geometry. The same happens if unconditional geometrical curves
of a certain sort are defined as the curves expressed, with respect to any system of lineal
coordinates, by equations of a certain form. In both cases, no need arises of stating and
solving problems concerned with the concepts of the different sorts of unconditional geo-
metrical curves.
For conditional geometrical curves, things go in a slightly different way. They can be
defined either by specifying conditional geometrical linkages purporting to trace them, or
by providing equations including coefficients which refer to some supposedly given segments,
and purporting to express these curves with respect to appropriate systems of lineal coordi-
nates. In the former case, to prove that these curves are available withinDescartes’s geometry,
one has merely to prove that the relevant linkages are so. In the latter, one has to prove that
the relevant system of coordinates is also available within this geometry (whichmeans that its
origin, its axis, and its angle are so), and the relevant equations can be determined.
As an example, consider the geometrical curves traced by proportions compasses. If they
are unconditional, they can be defined either as the curves traced by unconditional propor-
tions compasses, or as curves expressed, with respect to any system of orthogonal lineal
coordinates, by equations of the form x4n ¼ a2ðx2 þ y2Þ2n1, where ‘n’ stands for any natural
number and ‘a’ stands for any segment. It is enough to define these curves in one of these
92 M. Panzatwo ways to warrant that they are available within Descartes’s geometry. If they are
conditional, they can be defined either as the curves traced by conditional proportions com-
passes—i.e., a proportions compasses whose element AK0 (Fig. 11.1) is required to be equal
to a supposedly given segment and which is possibly so placed so as to trace this curve in an
appropriate position—or as the curves expressed, with respect to a certain determinate sys-
tem of orthogonal lineal coordinates, by equations of the form x4n ¼ a2ðx2 þ y2Þ2n1, where
‘n’ stands for any natural number and ‘a’ denotes a supposedly given segment. To prove
that these curves are available within Descartes’s geometry, one has to prove either that
these conditional proportions compasses are available within Descartes’s geometry, or that
this is the case for this system of coordinates and for the segment denoted by ‘a.’
These considerations are enough to show that the relation between definitions and exact-
ness norms of geometrical objects is different in Descartes’s geometry than in EPG.
Whereas problems complying with the ontological function66 are indispensable ingredients
of EPG, in Descartes’s geometry there is no room for new problems complying with this
function (unless some unconditional geometrical curves are defined in ways different to
the two mentioned above). Insofar as, in Descartes’s geometry as well as in EPG, problems
ask for constructions, all of them comply with the constructive function.67 Still, proving
new constructive clauses is far less important in the former geometry than in the latter.
On the other hand, in Descartes’s geometry there is room for problems asking for the iden-
tification and construction of the geometrical linkages tracing the curves expressed by cer-
tain equations or sorts of equations (or for the determination of the equations expressing
the curves traced by certain geometrical linkages or sorts of geometrical linkages), which
are absent from EPG.
Despite these structural differences, the identity conditions of geometrical linkages and
curves are, like those of EPG objects, only local and reduce to the identity conditions of
the corresponding diagrams. Hence, geometrical linkages and curves also do not form a
fixed domain of quantification and individual reference, in the sense explained in Section
2.1: each time one wants to refer individually to some of them, these have to be obtained,
or assumed to have been obtained anew.6866 Cf. Section 2.2.
67 Cf. Section 2.2.
68 If one adds that, in Descartes’s geometry, both geometrical linkages and geometrical curves are
obtained through constructions by rulers, compass, and reiteration, and that these constructions
enclose elementary constructions, one should understand why I take this geometry to be a
conservative extension of EPG, in the informal sense explained in Section 2.3. But one could also
wonder whether Descartes’s geometry could also be said to be a conservative extension of EPG in
some stronger sense. In modern logic, one says that a (formal) theory T is a conservative extension
of a (formal) theory T if and only if the language of T includes that of T and any theorem of T
formulated in the language of T is also a theorem of T. (This last requirement might not be
equivalent to the requirement that any logical consequence of the axioms of T formulated in the
language of T be also a logical consequence of the axioms of T. For example, this is not so for
second-order theories. In this case, one can define two distinct senses in which a theory is a
conservative extension of another one. I cannot enter these logical subtleties here.) One could then
wonder whether Descartes’s geometry could be said to be a conservative extension of EPG in some
sense close to this one. To try to respond to this question, one can reason as follows. Take G to be a
conservative extension of EPG in the informal sense explained in Section 2.3. Suppose that the
solution of any problem in G is converted into a theorem asserting that the objects whose
construction provides this same solution are available within G (i.e., can be obtained in a licensed
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allows a new modality of reference to these curves. One can refer to a plurality of curves
through expressions such as ‘the curves expressed by equations of degree 3,’ or ‘the curves
expressed by equations of the form x4n ¼ a2ðx2 þ y2Þ2n1.’ This is quite different from refer-
ring to a plurality of geometrical objects through expressions such as ‘the triangles,’ ‘the
parabolas,’ or ‘the radii of a given circle.’ The difference depends on the fact that forms
of equations are equations, that is, mathematical objects in turn.69 These objects are essen-
tially different from triangles or geometrical curves. This is not only because they are not
spatial, but overall because they have different identity conditions, and these conditions
are such that they do form a fixed domain of quantification and individual reference, in
the sense explained in Section 2.1. Moreover, forms of equations can be variously classified,
to provide a large variety of classifications for the corresponding sorts of curves.
Sorts of geometrical curves become, then, mathematical objects of a new kind, essentially
different from the geometrical curves themselves. An example will explain the difference.
Classical geometry deals with parabolas, but there is no object in it like the totality of all
the parabolas, or the parabola. There are only particular parabolas differing in the context
of single arguments.70 In Descartes’s algebraic geometry, there is, instead, an equation pro-
viding the canonical form of any equation expressing a parabola, and admitting a certain
range of possible transformations, which is a mathematical object, as such.
It is hard to overestimate the consequences of this difference for the evolution of math-
ematics. There is room to say that it makes modern mathematics begin. This probably
explains why historians have emphasized the connections between Descartes’s geometryway according to the exactness norms proper to G). Insofar as G is a conservative extension of EPG
in the previous informal sense, some of the theorems that are obtained in this way will be relative to
EPG objects available within EPG (one of these theorems will assert, for example, that equilateral
triangles are available within G). It is obvious that any theorem like these corresponds to a theorem
asserting that the same objects are available within EPG. But, of course, this is not enough for G to
be a conservative extension of EPG in a sense close to the modern formal one. One could even argue
that this does not happen any time that G is such that some EPG objects which are not available
within EPG are instead available within G. But suppose now that, despite being so, G is also such
that any theorem that can be proved in it about EPG objects available within EPG (and then also
within G itself) might also be proved in EPG. In this case, one could say that G is, after all, a
conservative extension of EPG in another sense close to the modern logical one. An interesting
question concerning Descartes’s geometry is whether it is a conservative extension of EPG in this
last sense.
69 This depends on what Manders has called ‘representational unresponsiveness’ of algebraic literal
notation [Manders 2008, 73]: the fact that a literal symbol entering into this notation and denoting a
particular object expresses no specific feature of this same object. This is because the same symbol
used to denote a particular geometric object, or a perfectly analogous symbol, can also denote other
objects of the same sort, or stand for any objects of the same sort. It is not the same for the literal
symbols used in classical geometry to denote geometrical objects, that is, for symbols such as ‘AB’
used to denote a segment. The reason is obvious: these symbols are used to denote the objects
represented by certain diagrams (either actually drawn or imagined: cf. footnote 18) to which they
are relative, and diagrams do not enjoy representational unresponsiveness.
70 One could say that, though there is nothing such as the parabola, there is at least the kind of
parabolas, understood as a particular kind of conics. Taken as a single object, this is not, however, a
mathematical object, since there is no way to mathematically operate on it, as such. At most, this is
the linguistic hypostasis of a mathematical concept.
94 M. Panzaand modern mathematics much more than they have insisted on its genetic relations with
EPG and classical geometry. I have tried, instead, to show some of these relations, by
emphasizing structural analogies and differences, and using them to account for Descartes’s
attitude towards geometrical exactness. Though I have presented this attitude as a founda-
tional one, I did not mean to undermine the centrality of Descartes’s concern for problem-
solving. What I have suggested is rather a way to articulate this concern with his founda-
tional program.
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